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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Although the United States has complied with adverse rulings in many past World Trade 
Organization (WTO) disputes, there are currently 11 cases in which rulings have not yet been 
implemented or the United States has taken action and the dispute has not been fully resolved. Under 
WTO dispute settlement rules, a WTO Member will generally be given a reasonable period of time to 
comply with an adverse WTO decision. While the Member is expected to remove the offending measure 
by the end of this period, compensation and temporary retaliation are available if the Member has not 
acted or taken sufficient action by this time. Either disputing party may request a compliance panel if 
there is disagreement over whether a Member has complied. 
Remaining unsettled are long-standing disputes with the European Union (EU) regarding a music 
copyright statute (DS160) and a statutory trademark provision affecting property confiscated by Cuba 
(DS176), as well as a dispute with Japan over a provision of U.S. antidumping law (DS184). The Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (“Byrd Amendment”), which was held WTO-inconsistent in 
January 2003 and repealed effective October 2005, remains the target of sanctions by complainants EU 
and Japan due to continued payments to U.S. firms authorized under the repeal legislation (P.L. 109-171) 
(DS217/DS234). Congress placed limits on funds that are available for these distributions in December 
2010 (P.L. 111-291, § 822). In addition, the United States and Antigua have been consulting on the 
resolution of outstanding issues in Antigua’s challenge of U.S. online gambling restrictions (DS285). 
Compensation agreements entered into by the United States with various WTO Members in exchange for 
the withdrawal by the United States of its WTO gambling commitments, an action taken by the United 
States to resolve the case, will not enter into effect until issues with Antigua are resolved. Congress 
repealed a WTO-inconsistent cotton program at issue in Brazil’s 2002 complaint over U.S. cotton 
subsidies in P.L. 109-171, but other programs were also successfully challenged and the United States 
was later found not to have fully complied (DS267). The United States since made statutory and 
administrative changes affecting the export credit guarantee program faulted in the case. While Brazil 
obtained authorization from the WTO to retaliate in the case, the two countries entered into a preliminary 
agreement in April 2010 that forestalled the imposition of sanctions and signed a framework agreement 
in June 2010 aimed at permanently resolving the dispute. The latter includes Brazil’s pledge not to impose 
sanctions during the life of the agreement and contemplates possible legislative resolution of the dispute 
in the 2012 farm bill. Brazil had earlier announced that it was entitled to impose $829.3 million in annual 
retaliation, $591 million of which would consist of import surcharges on U.S. goods. 
Five pending cases involve the U.S. practice of “zeroing,” under which the Department of Commerce 
(DOC), in calculating dumping margins in antidumping (AD) proceedings, disregards non-dumped sales. 
The U.S. practice was successfully challenged by the EU (DS294/DS350), Japan (DS322), Mexico 
(DS344), and South Korea (DS402), resulting in broad WTO prohibitions on U.S. use of the practice. The 
United States took administrative action to resolve one aspect of DS294 by abandoning zeroing in original 
AD investigations as of 2007. It has yet to fully comply, however, either in this case or in DS350, DS322, or 
DS344. While the EU and Japan requested the WTO to authorize sanctions, each agreed to suspend U.S.-
requested arbitration of their proposals in 2010 on the understanding that the United States would resolve 
outstanding issues in a timely fashion. To this end, DOC in December 2010 proposed to eliminate the use 
of zeroing in later stages of U.S. AD proceedings. A compliance panel proceeding is currently under way 
in the dispute with Mexico (DS344). An adverse panel report was adopted in Korea’s challenge (DS402) on 
February 24, 2011. 
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Summary 
Although the United States has complied with adverse rulings in many past World Trade 
Organization (WTO) disputes, there are currently 11 cases in which rulings have not yet been 
implemented or the United States has taken action and the dispute has not been fully resolved. 
Under WTO dispute settlement rules, a WTO Member will generally be given a reasonable period 
of time to comply with an adverse WTO decision. While the Member is expected to remove the 
offending measure by the end of this period, compensation and temporary retaliation are available 
if the Member has not acted or taken sufficient action by this time. Either disputing party may 
request a compliance panel if there is disagreement over whether a Member has complied. 
Remaining unsettled are long-standing disputes with the European Union (EU) regarding a music 
copyright statute (DS160) and a statutory trademark provision affecting property confiscated by 
Cuba (DS176), as well as a dispute with Japan over a provision of U.S. antidumping law 
(DS184). The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (“Byrd Amendment”), which 
was held WTO-inconsistent in January 2003 and repealed effective October 2005, remains the 
target of sanctions by complainants EU and Japan due to continued payments to U.S. firms 
authorized under the repeal legislation (P.L. 109-171) (DS217/DS234). Congress placed limits on 
funds that are available for these distributions in December 2010 (P.L. 111-291, § 822). In 
addition, the United States and Antigua have been consulting on the resolution of outstanding 
issues in Antigua’s challenge of U.S. online gambling restrictions (DS285). Compensation 
agreements entered into by the United States with various WTO Members in exchange for the 
withdrawal by the United States of its WTO gambling commitments, an action taken by the 
United States to resolve the case, will not enter into effect until issues with Antigua are resolved. 
Congress repealed a WTO-inconsistent cotton program at issue in Brazil’s 2002 complaint over 
U.S. cotton subsidies in P.L. 109-171, but other programs were also successfully challenged and 
the United States was later found not to have fully complied (DS267). The United States since 
made statutory and administrative changes affecting the export credit guarantee program faulted 
in the case. While Brazil obtained authorization from the WTO to retaliate in the case, the two 
countries entered into a preliminary agreement in April 2010 that forestalled the imposition of 
sanctions and signed a framework agreement in June 2010 aimed at permanently resolving the 
dispute. The latter includes Brazil’s pledge not to impose sanctions during the life of the 
agreement and contemplates possible legislative resolution of the dispute in the 2012 farm bill. 
Brazil had earlier announced that it was entitled to impose $829.3 million in annual retaliation, 
$591 million of which would consist of import surcharges on U.S. goods. 
Five pending cases involve the U.S. practice of “zeroing,” under which the Department of 
Commerce (DOC), in calculating dumping margins in antidumping (AD) proceedings, disregards 
non-dumped sales. The U.S. practice was successfully challenged by the EU (DS294/DS350), 
Japan (DS322), Mexico (DS344), and South Korea (DS402), resulting in broad WTO prohibitions 
on U.S. use of the practice. The United States took administrative action to resolve one aspect of 
DS294 by abandoning zeroing in original AD investigations as of 2007. It has yet to fully comply, 
however, either in this case or in DS350, DS322, or DS344. While the EU and Japan requested 
the WTO to authorize sanctions, each agreed to suspend U.S.-requested arbitration of their 
proposals in 2010 on the understanding that the United States would resolve outstanding issues in 
a timely fashion. To this end, DOC in December 2010 proposed to eliminate the use of zeroing in 
later stages of U.S. AD proceedings. A compliance panel proceeding is currently under way in the 
dispute with Mexico (DS344). An adverse panel report was adopted in Korea’s challenge 
(DS402) on February 24, 2011. 
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his report provides a summary of the status of U.S. compliance efforts in pending World 
Trade Organization (WTO) disputes that have resulted in adverse rulings against the 
United States. Although the United States has complied with adverse rulings in many past 
WTO disputes,1 there are 11 pending cases in which the United States has not fully implemented 
adopted WTO panel and Appellate Body reports or the United States has taken action, including 
the enactment of legislation, but the prevailing parties in the dispute continue to question whether 
the United States has fully complied and, in one case, continue to impose WTO-authorized trade 
sanctions. In all of these disputes, original or subsequently extended compliance deadlines have 
expired. Compliance in these cases may implicate either legislative or administrative action by 
the United States. 
The report begins with an overview of WTO dispute settlement procedures, focusing on the 
compliance phase of the process, followed by a discussion of U.S. laws relating to WTO dispute 
proceedings. The report then lists pending WTO disputes in the compliance phase, with a 
discussion of major issues and the U.S. compliance history in each. Each entry contains a section 
titled “Recent Developments,” which discusses the latest activity in the case. 
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures 
WTO disputes are conducted under the terms of the WTO Understanding on the Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU).2 
The DSU, which entered into force with the establishment of the World Trade Organization on 
January 1, 1995, carries forward and expands upon dispute settlement practices developed under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The DSU is administered by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is composed of all WTO Members. Where individual 
WTO agreements contain special or additional dispute settlement rules that differ from those in 
the DSU (e.g., expedited timelines for subsidy disputes in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures), the former will prevail. A list of these agreements and rules is 
contained in Appendix 2 of the DSU. The Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) represents the United States in the WTO and in WTO disputes. 
WTO dispute settlement may be characterized as a three-stage process: (1) consultations; (2) 
panel and, if requested, Appellate Body (AB) proceedings; and (3) implementation. Within this 
framework, the DSB establishes panels; adopts panel and appellate reports; authorizes 
countermeasures when requested; and monitors the implementation of dispute settlement results. 
The establishment of panels, adoption of panel and AB reports, and authorization of 
                                                             
1
 The case histories in this report are primarily based on WTO documents, available at http://www.wto.org, or the WTO 
dispute settlement website indicated below. This report does not address cases in which the United States has 
implemented adverse reports to the satisfaction of the complaining party and the dispute has been fully settled, nor does 
it discuss the compliance history of other WTO Members that have been found to be in violation of their WTO 
obligations. For further information on WTO disputes, see Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “WTO Dispute 
Settlement,” at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/dispute-settlement-proceedings/wto-dispute-settlement; 
the annual Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements 
Program, at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2009/asset_upload_file86_15410.pdf; and WTO, 
Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases (updated regularly), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_e.htm. 
2
 For further information on WTO dispute settlement procedures, see “Dispute settlement,” at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm, and CRS Report RS20088, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO): An Overview, by Jeanne J. Grimmett. 
T 
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countermeasures are decisions that are subject to a “reverse consensus” rule under which the DSB 
agrees to these actions unless all DSB Members object. In effect, these decisions are virtually 
automatic. Article 23 of the DSU requires a complaining Member to act in accordance with the 
DSU when it initiates a dispute, including making any internal determination that another 
Member has violated a WTO obligation consistent with the WTO decision in the case and 
following DSU procedures to set a deadline by which the defending Member must comply, 
determining the level of sanctions for non-compliance, and obtaining authorization from the DSB 
to impose any such sanctions. 
After the DSB adopts an adverse panel and any Appellate Body report, the defending Member 
must inform the DSB of its compliance plans. If it is impracticable for the Member to comply 
immediately, the Member will be allowed a “reasonable period of time” to do so. If the Member 
proposes a compliance period and it is not approved by the DSB, the disputing parties may 
negotiate a deadline themselves. If this fails, the length of the period will be arbitrated. A WTO 
Member found to have violated WTO obligations is expected to comply by withdrawing the 
offending measure by the end of the established compliance period, with compensation and 
temporary retaliation available to the prevailing party as alternative remedies. Full compliance is 
the preferred outcome, however, so as to ensure that negotiated rights and obligations are 
preserved and maintained. 
Article 22 of the DSU provides that if the prevailing Member in a dispute believes that the 
defending Member has not implemented the WTO rulings and recommendations by the end of the 
established compliance period, it may request the other Member to negotiate a compensation 
agreement or it may ask the DSB for authorization to suspend WTO concessions, usually to 
impose higher tariffs on selected imports from the defending country. The Member may choose 
the latter option without first requesting compensation. In some cases, the prevailing party may 
agree to extend the original compliance deadline instead of immediately seeking a remedy. 
If a prevailing Member does choose to suspend concessions, it is expected to do so in the same 
sector in which the WTO violation was found, but if the Member finds that this is not “practicable 
or effective,” it may seek to suspend concessions in other sectors in the same agreement. If, 
however, the Member finds that this alternative would also be impracticable or ineffective and 
that “the circumstances are serious enough,” it may seek to suspend obligations under another 
WTO agreement, referred to as “cross-retaliation.” A prevailing Member may seek to cross-
retaliate if, for example, in a dispute involving trade in goods, the Member does not import a 
sufficient amount of goods from the defending Member to remedy the trade injury involved or the 
Member believes that placing tariff surcharges on goods imported from the defending Member 
would be unreasonably costly for the prevailing Member’s economy. 
Under the DSU, the DSB is to authorize the retaliation request under the reverse consensus rule 
within 30 days after the compliance period expires. If the defending Member objects to the 
request, however, the proposed retaliation will be arbitrated and the 30-day deadline for 
approving the retaliation request effectively extended. The objection may relate to the level of 
nullification or impairment of benefits involved or whether DSU cross-retaliation rules have been 
followed. The arbitration, which may be carried out by the original panel if members are 
available, or by an arbitrator appointed by the WTO Director General, is ordinarily to be 
completed within 60 days after the compliance period expires. The DSB then meets to authorize 
the retaliation request, subject to any modification by the arbitrator. 
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In addition, Article 21.5 of the DSU provides for further dispute settlement proceedings in the 
event the disputing parties disagree as to whether the defending Member has implemented the 
WTO rulings and recommendations in a particular case. Once a compliance panel is convened, it 
is expected to issue its report within 90 days; the report may then be appealed. In practice, 
compliance panels may require a considerably longer period of time to complete their work where 
a complicated case is involved. For example, in the European Union’s challenge to the U.S. use of 
“zeroing” in antidumping proceedings (DS294), the EU made its compliance panel request in 
September 2007, panelists were appointed in November 2007, and the panel report was not 
publicly circulated until December 2008.  
Because the DSU fails to incorporate Article 21.5 proceedings into the 30-day period for 
approving countermeasures and the timeframe for any subsequent arbitration, a procedural 
problem, referred to as “sequencing,” has resulted. Disputing Members have often filled the gap 
by entering into ad hoc bilateral procedural agreements setting out timelines for any requested 
compliance-related proceedings and reserving Members’ rights in the unfolding of these 
proceedings.3 Such agreements have been entered into in many of the cases discussed below.  
The DSU provides that any suspension of concessions or other obligations is temporary and may 
only be applied by the prevailing Member until the WTO-inconsistent measure is removed, the 
defending Member provides a solution to any trade injury at issue, or a mutually satisfactory 
resolution of the dispute is reached.4 Moreover, if a prevailing Member is ultimately authorized to 
impose countermeasures, the Member is not required to implement them. As evident from some 
of the cases discussed in this report, WTO Members may manage disputes in a variety of ways at 
the compliance phase, short of imposing sanctions. 
                                                             
3
 See Sylvia A. Rhodes, The Article 21.5/22 Problem: Clarification Through Bilateral Agreements?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
553 (2000). 
4
 The DSU does not expressly set out a procedure for obtaining the removal of countermeasures, though Members may 
obtain a ruling on whether continued imposition is warranted either through a compliance panel or a new dispute 
settlement proceeding. The issue of removing such measures arose in connection with the continued levying of 
increased tariffs on imports from the European Union (EC) by the United States and Canada in response to the EC’s 
failure to comply with WTO decisions faulting European Union import restrictions on beef produced with growth 
hormones. The EC initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the United States and Canada in 2004. The 
Appellate Body, reversing the panel on various points, recommended that the disputing parties request an Article 21.5 
compliance panel proceeding in order to resolve their differences as to whether the EC is in compliance in the 
underlying beef hormone cases (DS26/DS48) and whether the U.S. and Canadian countermeasures thus have a legal 
basis. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, 
WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008); Appellate Body Report, Canada—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008). The EC requested consultations under Article 21.5 in December 
2008, but the proceeding involving the United States has since been suspended as part of a bilateral agreement intended 
to resolve the beef hormone dispute. Press Release, Office of the USTR, USTR Announces Agreement with European 
Union in Beef Hormones Dispute (updated June 22, 2009), at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/
2009/may/ustr-announces-agreement-european-union-beef-hormones-; European Commission, Memorandum on Beef 
Hormones dispute signed with the United States (May 14, 2009), at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/
dispute/memo140509_en.htm. 
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Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA): Statutory 
Requirements for Implementing WTO Decisions 
The legal effect of Uruguay Round agreements and WTO dispute settlement results in the United 
States is comprehensively dealt with in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), P.L. 103-
465, which addresses the relationship of WTO agreements to federal and state law and prohibits 
private remedies based on alleged violations of WTO agreements.5 The statute also requires the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to keep Congress informed of disputes challenging 
U.S. laws once a dispute panel is established, any U.S. appeal is filed, and a panel or Appellate 
Body report is circulated to WTO Members.6 In addition, the URAA places requirements on 
regulatory action taken to implement WTO decisions and contains provisions specific to the 
implementation of panel and appellate reports that fault U.S. actions in trade remedy proceedings. 
Section 102: Domestic Legal Effect of WTO Decisions 
Section 102 of the URAA and its legislative history establish that domestic law supersedes any 
inconsistent provisions of the Uruguay Round agreements and that congressional or 
administrative action, as the case may be, is required to implement adverse decisions in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings. 
Federal Law 
Section 102(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1), provides that “[n]o provision of any of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that 
is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.” The URAA further provides, 
at § 102(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2), that nothing in the statute “shall be construed ... to amend 
or modify any law of the United States ... or ... to limit any authority conferred under any law of 
the United States ... unless specifically provided for in this act.” 
As explained in Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) accompanying the Uruguay Round 
agreements when they were submitted to Congress in 1994, “[i]f there is a conflict between U.S. 
law and any of the Uruguay Round agreements, section 102(a) of the implementing bill makes 
clear that U.S. law will take precedence.”7 Moreover, section 102 is further intended to clarify 
that all changes to U.S. law “known to be necessary or appropriate” to implement the WTO 
agreements are incorporated in the URAA and that any unforeseen conflicts between U.S. law 
                                                             
5
 For background discussions regarding the effect of treaties and international agreements in domestic law, see CRS 
Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. Law, by Michael John Garcia; Ronald A. 
Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European Union, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 556 (1996-97); and John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 310 (1992). 
6
 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), § 123(d)-(f), 19 U.S.C. § 3533(d)-(f). 
7
 Uruguay Round Agreements, Statement of Administrative Action, H.Doc. 103-316(I) at 659 (1994)[hereinafter cited 
as Uruguay Round SAA]. The SAA, which was expressly approved in the URAA, is “regarded as an authoritative 
expression by the United States concerning the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agreements and ... 
[the URAA] in any judicial proceeding in which a question arises concerning such interpretation or application.” 
URAA, § 102(d), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d).  
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and the WTO agreements “can be enacted in subsequent legislation”8 Congress has traditionally 
treated potential conflicts with prior GATT agreements and free trade agreements in this way, 
treatment that it also deems to be “consistent with the Congressional view that necessary changes 
in Federal statutes should be specifically enacted, not preempted by international agreements.”9 
This approach carries over into the implementation of WTO dispute settlement results, a situation 
explained as follows in URAA legislative history: 
Since the Uruguay Round agreements as approved by the Congress, or any subsequent 
amendments to those agreements, are non-self-executing, any dispute settlement findings 
that a U.S. statute is inconsistent with an agreement also cannot be implemented except by 
legislation approved by the Congress unless consistent implementation is permissible under 
the terms of the statute.10 
State Law 
Where a state law is at issue in a WTO dispute, the URAA provides for federal-state cooperation 
in the proceeding and limits any domestic legal challenges to the law to the United States.11 The 
act’s general preclusion of private remedies (discussed below) further centralizes the response to 
adverse WTO decisions involving state law in the federal government.12 
Section 102(b) provides as follows: 
No State law, or the application of such a State law, may be declared invalid as to any person 
or circumstance on the ground that the provision or its application is inconsistent with any of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, except in an action brought by the United States for the 
purposes of declaring such law or application invalid.13 
                                                             
8
 H.Rept. 103-826(I), at 25; see also S.Rept. 103-412, at 13. 
9
 H.Rept. 103-826(I), at 25; see also S.Rept. 103-412, at 13. 
10
 H.Rept. 103-826(I), at 25; see also S.Rept. 103-412, at 13, and the Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 1032-33. 
The latter states as follows: “Reports issued by panels or the Appellate Body under the DSU have no binding effect 
under the law of the United States and do not represent an expression of U.S. foreign or trade policy. They are no 
different in this respect than those issued by GATT panels since 1947. If a report recommends that the United States 
change federal law to bring it into conformity with a Uruguay Round agreement, it is for the Congress to decide 
whether any such change will be made.” 
11
 A challenge by Brazil to Florida’s equalizing excise tax on processed orange and grapefruit products (WT/DS250) 
was resolved in 2004 without panelists having been appointed after Florida amended its statute. Notification of 
Mutually Agreed Solution, United States—Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on Processed Orange and 
Grapefruit Products, WT/DS250/3 (June 2, 2004); U.S. Brazil Settle Long-standing Dispute Over Florida Tax to 
Promote Citrus Products, 21 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 945 (2004). In the challenge by Antigua and Barbuda to both 
federal and state laws affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services (DS285), the United States 
prevailed on the issue of whether the state measures infringed market access obligations under the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS). The WTO Appellate Body found that the panel had erred in considering whether the 
eight laws at issue violated the Agreement because the complainant had not presented sufficient evidence and legal 
arguments to establish a prima facie case. United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services, WT/DS285. See infra text accompanying notes 211-255 for further discussion of this case. 
12
 For further discussion, see Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 676. 
13
 URAA, § 102(b)(2)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A). The term “State law” is defined to include “any law of a political 
subdivision of a State, as well as any State law that regulates or taxes the business of insurance.” URAA, § 102(b)(3), 
19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(3). The term is intended to encompass “any provision of a state constitution, regulation, practice or 
other state measure.” Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 674. 
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According to legislative history, the provision “makes clear that the Uruguay Round agreements 
do not automatically preempt State laws that do not conform to their provisions, even if a WTO 
dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body were to determine that a particular State measure 
was inconsistent with one or more of the Uruguay Round agreements.”14 The statute also contains 
certain restrictions in any such legal action brought by the United States, including that the report 
of the WTO dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body may not be considered binding or 
otherwise accorded deference.15 Any such suit by the United States is expected to be a rarity.16 
Preclusion of Private Remedies 
Private remedies are prohibited under § 102(c)(1) of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1), which 
provides that “[n]o person other than the United States ... shall have a cause of action or defense 
under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements or by virtue of congressional approval of such an 
agreements” or “may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or 
inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or 
any political subdivision of a State, on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with 
such agreement.” 
Congress has additionally stated in § 102(c)(2) of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(2), that it 
intends, through the prohibition on private remedies: 
to occupy the field with respect to any cause of action or defense under or in connection with 
any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including by precluding any person other than the 
United States from bringing any action against any State or political subdivision thereof or 
raising any defense to the application of State law under or in connection with any of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements— 
(A) on the basis of a judgment obtained by the United States in an action brought under any 
such agreement; or 
(B) on any other basis. 
The House Ways and Means Committee report on the URAA discusses the rationale and 
implications of § 102(c) as follows: 
                                                             
14
 S.Rept. 103-412, at 15; see also H.Rept. 103-826(I), at 25, and Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 670. 
15
 URAA, § 102(b)(2)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(B). In addition, the United States will have the burden of proving 
that the State law or its application is inconsistent with the WTO agreement in question; any State whose interests may 
be impaired or impeded by the suit will have the unconditional right to intervene as a party, and the United States will 
be entitled to amend its complaint to include a claim or cross-claim concerning the law of a State that does intervene; 
and any State law that is declared invalid will not be considered to have been invalid in its application during any 
period before the court’s judgment becomes final and all timely appeals are exhausted. The statute also requires the 
United States Trade Representative to notify Congress before bringing any such suit. URAA, § 102(b)(2)(C), 19 U.S.C. 
§ 3512(b)(2)(C). 
16
 Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 674; H.Rept. 103-826(I), at 26; S.Rept. 103-412, at 15. The SAA states, inter 
alia, that the Attorney General “will be particularly careful in considering recourse to this authority where the state 
measure involved is aimed at the protection of human, animal, or plant health or of the environment or the state 
measure is a state tax of a type that has been held to be consistent with the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. In 
such a case, the Attorney General would entertain use of this statutory authority only if consultations between the 
President and the Governor of the State concerned failed to yield an appropriate alternative.” Uruguay Round SAA, 
supra note 7, at 674. 
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For example, a private party cannot bring an action to require, preclude, or modify 
government exercise of discretionary or general “public interest” authorities under other 
provisions of law. These prohibitions are based on the premise that it is the responsibility of 
the Federal Government, and not private citizens, to ensure that Federal or State laws are 
consistent with U.S. obligations under international agreements such as the Uruguay Round 
agreements.17 
The SAA notes, however, that § 102(c) “does not preclude any agency of government from 
considering, or entertaining argument on, whether its action or proposed action is consistent with 
the Uruguay Round agreements, although any change in agency action would have to be 
authorized by domestic law.”18 
Domestic Implementation of WTO Decisions Involving 
Administrative Action 
In addition to the URAA provisions that limit the direct effect of WTO rules and decisions in U.S. 
law, the URAA also places requirements on agencies in their implementation of WTO panel and 
Appellate Body reports. These provisions apply to regulatory action in general and to new agency 
determinations in response to WTO decisions involving trade remedy proceedings. 
Section 123: Regulatory Action Generally 
Section 123(g) of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g), provides that in any WTO case in which a 
departmental or agency regulation or practice has been found to be inconsistent with a WTO 
agreement, the regulation or practice may not be rescinded or modified in implementation of the 
decision “unless and until” the United States Trade Representative and relevant agencies meet 
congressional consultation and private sector advice requirements, the proposal has been 
published in the Federal Register with a request for public comment, and the final rule or other 
modification has been published in the Federal Register.19 Section 123(g) does not apply to any 
regulation or practice of the U.S. International Trade Commission. 
The statute requires the USTR to consult with “the appropriate congressional committees” 
regarding the proposed contents of the final rule or other modification. These committees include 
the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and any other 
congressional committees that have jurisdiction over matter at hand.20 In addition, the final rule or 
other modification may not take effect until 60 days after the USTR has begun committee 
consultations, unless the President determines that an earlier effective date is in the national 
                                                             
17
 H.Rept. 103-826(I), at 26. 
18
 Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 676. 
19
 The provision first came into play in 1996 when the United States took regulatory action to comply with the adverse 
WTO decision in United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2, WT/DS4. See 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Decision on Gasoline Rule (Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline), 61 Fed. Reg. 
33703 (1996). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the final issued by EPA to resolve 
the dispute, finding, inter alia, that the agency was not statutorily precluded from considering factors other than air 
quality in issuing rules under the antidumping provision of the Clean Air Act and could thus consider the effect of the 
proposed rule on U.S. treaty obligations. George E. Warren Corp. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 159 F.3d 
616 (D.C.Cir. 1998). 
20
 URAA, § 121(3), 19 U.S.C. § 3531(3). 
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interest. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee may vote to 
indicate the disagreement of the committee with the proposed action during the 60-day period. 
Any such vote is not binding on the agency or department involved.21 
Section 129: Agency Determinations in Trade Remedy Proceedings 
Section 129 of the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3538, sets forth authorities and procedures under which 
the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) may 
issue new subsidy, dumping and injury determinations, referred to as Section 129 Determinations, 
in implementation of adverse WTO decisions involving U.S. safeguards, antidumping, and 
countervailing duty proceedings. Section 129 does not authorize the Commerce Department or 
the ITC to issue new determinations on their own motion, but instead grants the USTR the 
discretion to direct the agency to do so in a given case. 
In antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, which are carried out under authorities in 
Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677n, the Commerce Department 
determines the existence and level of dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, and the ITC 
determines whether the dumped or subsidized imports cause material injury, or a threat of 
material injury, to a domestic industry. Under U.S. safeguards law, set forth in Title II of the Trade 
Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254, the ITC conducts investigations to determine if increased 
imports, whether or not they are fairly traded, are a substantial cause of serious injury to a 
domestic industry. If the ITC makes an affirmative injury determination, it recommends remedial 
measures (e.g., a tariff surcharge or import quota) to the President, who ultimately determines 
whether or not to take action. 
Implemented Section 129 Determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases are 
reviewable in the U.S. Court of International Trade and by binational panels established under 
Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).22 Chapter 19 panels are 
available to review final agency determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty 
investigations involving NAFTA countries in lieu of judicial review in the country in which the 
determination is made. 
                                                             
21
 Two 110th Congress bills would have placed restrictions on the use of section 123 authorities. S. 364 (Rockefeller) 
would have amended section 123 to provide that any regulatory modification or final rule proposed under the section 
could only enter into force if approved by joint resolution enacted into public law. The bill would also have rescinded 
certain § 123 regulatory modifications that had already taken effect. S. 1919 (Baucus) would have established a WTO 
Dispute Settlement Review Commission to evaluate WTO decisions under statutory criteria and prohibited a domestic 
regulatory modification under section 123 from taking effect unless and until Congress received the Commission’s 
report on the WTO decision involved. No action was taken on either of these bills. See also infra note 318. 
22
 URAA, § 129(e), adding Tariff Act of 1930, § 516A(a)(2)(B)(vii), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vii)), and amending 
Tariff Act of 1930, § 516A(g)(8)(A)(i), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(8)(A)(i). 
The Uruguay Round SAA states the following regarding the legal implications of possible parallel judicial proceedings 
regarding the same agency determinations: 
Since implemented determinations under section 129 may be appealed, it is possible that 
Commerce or the ITC maybe in the position of simultaneously defending determinations in which 
the agency reached different conclusions. In such situations, the Administration expects that courts 
and binational panels will be sensitive to the fact that under the applicable standard of review, as set 
forth in statute and case law, multiple permissible interpretations of the law and the facts may be 
legally permissible in any particular case, and the issuance of a different determination under 
section 129 does not signify that the initial determination was unlawful. 
Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 1027. 
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U.S. International Trade Commission 
If an interim WTO panel report or a WTO Appellate Body report concludes that an action by the 
ITC in connection with a trade remedy proceeding is inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, or the 
Agreement on Safeguards, the USTR may request the ITC to issue an advisory report on whether 
U.S. antidumping, countervailing duty, or safeguards law, as appropriate, allows the ITC to take 
steps with respect to the proceeding at issue that would render its action “not inconsistent with” 
the panel or AB findings.23 
The ITC is to report to the USTR within 30 calendar days of the USTR’s request where an interim 
report is involved, and within 21 calendar days in case of an AB report.24 These deadlines are 
aimed at ensuring that the USTR will receive the requested advice in time to decide whether to 
appeal a panel’s interim report or to implement an adverse report, and to estimate the period of 
time that may be needed to implementing the WTO decision.25 
If a majority of the ITC Commissioners have found that action may be taken under existing law, 
the USTR must consult with the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance 
Committee and may request the ITC in writing to issue a new determination in the underlying 
proceeding that would render the ITC action “not inconsistent with” the WTO findings.26 The 
new determination must be issued within 120 days of the USTR’s request.27 The 120-day limit is 
intended to allow the USTR to propose a reasonable period of time for implementation to the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body once the DSB adopts a WTO panel and any Appellate Body 
report in a case.28 
In the event the ITC issues a new negative injury or threat of injury determination, the imports 
subject to antidumping or countervailing duty order at issue, or a least a portion of them, would 
no longer be considered to have caused a harmful effect, even though they may in fact be dumped 
or subsidized. The Tariff Act requires that the imposition of antidumping or countervailing duties 
on dumped or subsidized imports be supported by an affirmative injury determination and thus, 
absent such a determination, the antidumping or countervailing duty order would need to be 
revoked in whole or in part. Section 129(a)(6) authorizes the USTR to direct the Commerce 
Department to take this action.29 The USTR must consult with the House Ways and Means and 
Senate Finance Committees before the ITC’s new determination is implemented.30 
Where a safeguard proceeding is involved, section 129 authorizes the President, after receiving a 
new ITC determination, to reduce, modify, or terminate the safeguard notwithstanding other 
                                                             
23
 URAA, § 129(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a)(1). 
24
 URAA, § 129(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a)(2). 
25
 Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 1023. 
26
 URAA, § 129(a)(3),(4), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a)(3),(4). 
27
 ITC authority to issue a new determination is granted “notwithstanding any provision of Tariff Act of 1930 ... or title 
II of the Trade Act of 1974.” The Uruguay Round SAA explains that “[m]any of the ITC’s proceedings are time-
limited by statute, and the ITC cannot revisit its actions in those proceedings in the absence of the authority provided 
by subsection (a)(4) or a remand.” Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 1024. 
28
 Id. 
29
 URAA, § 129(a)(6), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a)(6). 
30
 URAA, § 129(a)(5),(6), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a)(5),(6). 
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statutory requirements governing changes in existing safeguard measures.31 The President must 
consult with the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee before acting 
under this authority. The USTR is required to publish a notice of the implementation of any ITC 
determination in the Federal Register.32 
Department of Commerce 
Section 129 also sets out a procedure for new Department of Commerce determinations in 
antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings, though without the requirement for an initial 
agency advisory report regarding the scope of the agency’s statutory discretion. Instead, promptly 
after the issuance of a WTO panel or Appellate Body report finding that a DOC determination in 
an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeds is inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement or the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the 
USTR is to consult with the Commerce Department and the House Ways and Means and Senate 
Finance Committees, and may request the department, in writing, to issue a determination in 
connection with the underlying antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding that would render 
its action “not inconsistent with” the panel or appellate findings.33 The Commerce Department 
must issue its Section 129 Determination within 180 days of the request.34 A new determination 
may, for example, reduce the dumping margin or net subsidy and thus result in a reduction of 
existing duties. After consulting with DOC and the above-named congressional committees, 
USTR may direct DOC to implement its determination in whole or in part.35  
Prospective Implementation of Section 129 Determinations 
Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA provides that Section 129 Determinations, whether issued by the 
ITC or the Commerce Department, apply prospectively, that is, the full or partial revocation of the 
antidumping or countervailing duty order or the implementation of the DOC determination, as the 
case may be, applies to unliquidated entries of the subject merchandise that are entered, or 
withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the date on which the USTR directs the 
Commerce Department to revoke the order or implement the determination.36 Unliquidated 
entries are those for which the U.S. Customs and Border Protection has not ascertained a final 
                                                             
31
 URAA, § 129(a)(7), 19 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). 
32
 URAA, § 129(c)(2)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(c)(2)(B). 
33
 URAA, § 129(b)(1),(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(1),(2). Senate legislative history indicates that USTR is expected to 
“consult closely with Commerce in order to ensure that it benefits from Commerce’s expertise with respect to both the 
panel or Appellate Body reports and the appropriate implementing action (if any), including the implications of any 
such action on the administration of the antidumping or countervailing duty law.” S.Rept. 103-412, at 27. The Senate 
Finance Committee has further stated that it “expects to be consulted closely by the Administration throughout this 
process, and to be informed and provided an explanation should USTR decide to implement an adverse panel or 
Appellate Body decision notwithstanding a contrary recommendation by Commerce.” Id. If USTR directs Commerce 
to implement the new determination, “Commerce may do so even if litigation is pending with respect to the initial 
agency determination.” H.Rept. 103-826(I), at 39. 
34
 URAA, § 129(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(2). 
35
 URAA, § 129(b)(3),(4), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(3),(4). 
36
 URAA, § 129(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3538(c)(1). This provision has been held to be unambiguous in its prospective 
effect. E.g., Corus Staal BV, v. United States, 593 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1382-83 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008). 
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rate and amount of duty.37 Notices of the implementation of Section 129 Determinations must be 
published in the Federal Register. 
The Uruguay Round SAA explains the operation of § 129(c)(1) as follows: 
Consistent with the principle that GATT panel recommendations apply only prospectively, 
subsection 129(c)(1) provides that where determinations by the ITC or Commerce are 
implemented under subsections (a) or (b), such determinations have prospective effect only. 
That is, they apply to unliquidated entries of merchandise entered, or withdrawn from 
warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which the Trade Representative directs 
implementation. Thus, relief available under subsection 129(c)(1) is distinguishable from 
relief available in an action brought before a court or a NAFTA binational panel, where, 
depending on the circumstances of the case, retroactive relief may be available. Under 
129(c)(1), if implementation of a WTO report should result in the revocation of an 
antidumping or countervailing duty order, entries made prior to the date of Trade 
Representative’s direction would remain subject to potential duty liability.38 
Canada unsuccessfully challenged § 129(c)(1) in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding in 2001 
on the ground that the provision violated the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and various 
WTO antidumping and countervailing duty obligations. Under the retrospective U.S. antidumping 
and countervailing duty system, DOC ordinarily makes a final assessment of the duties owed on 
dumped or subsidized goods in an administrative review conducted after the goods are imported. 
The review covers goods that enter the United States during a specified prior 12-month period. 
Until this final duty assessment is made for particular goods, importers must deposit estimated 
duties with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on entry.39 Canada argued that, where a 
DOC or ITC determination in an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding is found to 
violate a WTO obligation, § 129(c)(1) effectively prohibits the United States from fully 
complying with the WTO decision by preventing it from refunding estimated duties deposited 
with CBP before the date that the Section 129 Determination is implemented. In other words, 
because the duty deposits supported by the challenged determination would no longer have a 
WTO-consistent basis, Canada argued that they must be returned.40 
In response to Canada’s claim, the United States maintained that § 129(c)(1) addresses only the 
treatment of imports entered after the implementation date and does not govern the treatment of 
prior entries for which final duties have not yet been calculated. The United States further argued 
that the statute does not mandate any particular treatment of these prior unliquidated entries and 
that the United States has other legal options for dealing with them, including establishing a new 
dumping or subsidy margin by using a WTO-consistent methodology in an administrative review 
of the entries or, in the event the duty order or orders were revoked as a result of the WTO 
                                                             
37
 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Importing into the United States; A Guide for Commercial Importers 105-106 
(2002 ed.), at http://www.cbp.gov/nafta/cgov/pdf/iius.pdf. 
38
 Uruguay Round SAA, supra note 7, at 1026. See also H.Rept. 103-826(I), at 39; S.Rept. 103-412, at 27. 
39
 Trade Act of 1974, § 751(a), 19 U.S.C. §1675(a), 19 C.F.R, § 351.212(a), 351.213. The rate determined in the 
administrative review is also the rate at which estimated duties on imports entered during the succeeding year are 
assessed and will apply until any subsequent administrative review produces a new rate. 
40
 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada, United States—Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, WT/DS221/4 (July 13, 2001). 
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proceeding, revising the duty rate in response to a domestic court decision involving the earlier 
entries.41 
In a report issued in July 2002, the WTO panel concluded that Canada failed to establish that the 
statute either required WTO-inconsistent action on the part of the United States or precluded the 
United States from taking action in accordance with its WTO obligations.42 Canada did not 
appeal, and the panel report was adopted by the DSB in August 2002. 
Judicial Responses 
Although private rights of action based on Uruguay Round agreements are precluded under § 
102(c) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WTO panel findings have at times been brought to 
the attention of federal courts, most often in challenges to agency determinations in antidumping 
and countervailing duty proceedings initiated under judicial review provisions contained in § 
516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. Section 129 determinations issued by the ITC 
and the Commerce Department to comply with WTO decisions are also reviewable under this 
statute. These cases are heard in the U.S. Court of International Trade (USCIT), which has 
exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions brought under § 516A.43 The USCIT’s decisions may be 
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, whose decisions are reviewable by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Federal courts must hold a final agency determination in an antidumping or countervailing duty 
proceeding or a Section 129 Determination unlawful if it is found to be “unsupported by 
substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”44 To determine 
whether an agency legal interpretation applied in an agency determination is in accordance with 
law, the court employs the two-step analysis set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).45 First, the court, using 
tools of statutory construction, determines whether Congress has clearly spoken to the issue at 
hand. Second, if the underlying statute is silent or ambiguous, the court decides whether the 
agency’s construction of the statute is permissible and will defer to an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute provided it is reasonable. It has also been argued that, in considering whether an agency 
construction is reasonable for purposes of the second prong of the Chevron test, the court should 
apply the canon of construction articulated by the Supreme Court in 1804 in Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). This canon holds that where a statute does not 
require a specific interpretation, that is, it permits more than one interpretation, it should be 
interpreted consistently with U.S. international obligations.46 In the current context, the 
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 Second Written Submission of the United States, United States—Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (WT/DS221), paras. 17-20 (Mar. 8, 2002), at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/688. 
42
 Panel Report, United States—Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS221/R (July 15, 
2002). 
43
 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)(enacted in Customs Courts Act of 1980, P.L. 96-417, § 201). 
44
 Tariff Act of 1930, § 516A(b)(1)(B)(i), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). 
45
 See United States v. Eurodif S.A., 129 S.Ct. 878, 886-87 (2009); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 
(2001). See also Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. 
v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 1379-82 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994), Corus Staal BV v. United States, 593 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1381-82 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008); Windmill Int’l PTE 
v. United States, 193 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1305-306 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002); Cultivos Miramonte S.A. v. United States, 980 
F.Supp. 1268, 1271-72 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997).  
46
 See, e.g, Corus Staal BV v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 259 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1262 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003) and generally 
(continued...) 
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international obligation would be that contained in a WTO agreement, either by itself or as 
interpreted in one or more WTO decisions.47 Plaintiffs thus argue, on the basis of the Charming 
Betsy canon, that an agency interpretation that violates a WTO obligation is unreasonable under 
Chevron step two. 
Because the underlying cause of action in domestic legal challenges to the agency actions 
described above is based in the Tariff Act and not on a provision of a WTO agreement, courts 
have not viewed § 102(c) of the URAA as preventing them from hearing a WTO-based argument 
in these challenges.48 When faced with such arguments, courts may deem WTO decisions to be 
“persuasive”49 or a source of useful reasoning, “if sound” to inform a court’s decision,50 but state 
that WTO decisions are not binding on the United States, U.S. agencies, or the judiciary.51 Most 
recently, courts have made clear that, given the statutory scheme established in the URAA for 
implementing adverse WTO decisions, questions as to whether the United States should comply 
with an adverse WTO decision, and what the extent of U.S. compliance should be, are matters 
falling within the province of the executive branch.52 As a result, in ruling on whether an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute is reasonable, courts have rejected Charming Betsy arguments and 
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Jane A. Restani & Ira Bloom, Interpreting International Trade Statutes: Is The Charming Betsy Sinking? 24 FORDHAM 
INT’L L. J. 1533 (2001). The Charming Betsy canon stems from the following Supreme Court language: “It has also 
been observed, that an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible 
construction remains, and consequently, can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, 
further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
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 See, e.g, Corus Staal BV v. Dept. of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S.Ct. 1023 
(2006); Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Corus Staal BV v. United States, 593 
F.Supp.2d 1373, 1383-84 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008).  
48
 E.g., SNR Roulements v. United States, 341 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1341 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004); Timken v. United States, 
240 F.Supp. 2d 1228, 1238 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002); Gov’t of Uzbekistan v. United States, 2001 WL 1012780, at *3 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade Aug. 30, 2001).  
49
 Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 442 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct. Intl Trade 2006), citing, inter alia, NSK Ltd. v. 
United States, 358 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1288 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005). Note also that in Cummings Inc. v. United States, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a classification opinion of the World Customs Organization “is not 
binding and is entitled, at most, to ‘respectful consideration’” by a U.S. court. 454 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
50
 Hyundai Electronics Co. v. United States, 53 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1343 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999); see also, e.g., Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
51
 Corus Staal BV v. Dept. of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S.Ct. 1023 (2006). 
See also Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 
442 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006). For discussions of federal cases addressing the domestic effect of 
WTO decisions, see, e.g., Robin Miller, Effect of World Trade Organization (WTO) Decisions Upon United States, 17 
A.L.R.FED.2D 1 (2007) and Patrick C. Reed, Relationship of WTO Obligations to U.S. International Trade Law: 
Internationalist Vision Meets Domestic Reality, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 209 (2006). 
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 Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 551 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(“The determination whether, when, and how 
to comply with the WTO’s decision on ‘zeroing’, involves delicate and subtle political judgments that are within the 
authority of the Executive and not the Judicial Branch.”); Corus Staal BV v. Dept. of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S.Ct. 1023 (2006); SKF USA v. United States, 611 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1359-60 (Ct. Intl 
Trade 2009); Corus Staal BV v. United States, 593 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1383-85 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008). See also Koyo 
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declined to base their decision making on a WTO decision adverse to the United States where the 
executive branch has not taken the necessary domestic action to comply.53 
Pending Cases Involving Legislative Action 
Six WTO dispute proceedings that involve federal statutes remain pending—that is, panel and 
Appellate Body reports adverse to the United States have been adopted by the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) and compliance issues have not yet been fully resolved. Among these are 
two long-standing disputes with the European Union (EU),54 one involving § 110(5)(B) of the 
Copyright Act, a statute affecting music licensing, and the other, § 211 of the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, a statute addressing trademarks that involve property confiscated by 
Cuba. Another is a long-standing dispute with Japan involving a provision of the U.S. 
antidumping statute governing the calculation of dumping rates for producers and exporters who 
are not individually investigated by the Commerce Department. 
While Congress repealed the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, a statute 
which required the distribution of collected antidumping and countervailing duties to petitioners 
and interested parties in the underlying trade remedy proceedings, the repeal legislation mandates 
the distribution to U.S. firms of duties collected on goods entered through September 30, 2007, 
two years after the statutory repeal date of October 1, 2005. The European Union and Japan, two 
complainants who have objected to these continued distributions, are continuing to retaliate with 
tariff surcharges on U.S. goods. 
As the result of a completed compliance panel proceeding, the United States has been found not 
to have fully complied in Brazil’s challenge to U.S. cotton subsidies and faces the possibility of 
retaliation by Brazil against U.S. goods and possibly U.S. services or intellectual property 
interests. While Congress repealed or made statutory changes to U.S. export credit guarantee 
programs that were found by the WTO to be prohibited subsidies and the executive branch made 
administrative changes to one of these programs under revised statutory authority, Congress also 
reauthorized payments under two domestic support programs that Brazil successfully challenged 
as actionable subsidies. Payments under these programs were found to cause serious prejudice to 
Brazil in the form of significant price suppression in the world upland cotton market. Brazil is 
currently authorized to impose sanctions to remedy both prohibited and actionable subsidy 
measures at issue in the case. 
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 E.g., Corus Staal BV v. Dept. of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S.Ct. 1023 
(2006) and SNR Roulements v. United States, 341 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1343-44 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004). See also Mary Jane 
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 As of December 1, 2009, “European Union” replaced “European Communities” as the official name of this WTO 
Member. The terms European Communities and EC still appear in older WTO materials, including panel and Appellate 
Body reports, bilateral procedural agreements in particular disputes, and communications to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body. Except for references to any such older WTO documents, this report uses the name “European 
Union” or the acronym “EU” in the text of the report regardless of the time period being discussed. For further 
information, see European Union or Communities?, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/
european_union_or_communities_popup.htm. 
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Antigua’s challenge to federal laws governing the remote supply of gambling services, while only 
partially successful, left certain issues unresolved and resulted in the United States withdrawing 
its market access commitments for gambling services under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). Antigua sought both retaliation in the WTO dispute and compensation under 
the GATS for the negative effects of the change in the U.S. GATS commitments. Outstanding 
issues still remain subject to discussion by the two parties. 
In addition, a panel report adverse to the United States was issued in September 2010 in a case 
initiated by China, but because the challenged measure had expired before the panel concluded its 
work, the United States was not required to take any action. In United States—Certain Measures 
Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, the WTO panel found that a U.S. appropriations 
restriction set to expire on September 30, 2009, which prohibited the use of appropriated funds 
“to establish or implement a rule allowing poultry products to be imported into the United States 
from the People’s Republic of China,” violated U.S. obligations under the WTO Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the GATT most-favored nation article, and the GATT 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions.55 There was no appeal in the case and the panel report was 
adopted on October 25, 2010.  
Section 110(5)(B) of the Copyright Act (Music Copyrights)(DS160) 
This case, sometimes referred to as the “Irish music” dispute, involves legislation enacted in 1998 
(17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(b), as added by P.L. 105-298, § 202(a)), which provides that it is not a 
copyright infringement for bars and restaurants and other retail outlets to play radio and television 
music without authorization from the copyright holder or the payment of fees so long as the 
establishments meet certain size limitations or equipment requirements.56 Challenged by the 
European Union (EU) in 1999, this so-called “small business” exemption was found to be an 
improper rights limitation in violation of Article 13 of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
In the absence of U.S. legislative action by the end of the initial compliance period (July 27, 
2001), complainant EU agreed to extend the period to the end of 2001, and to consider U.S. 
compensation for the EU music industry based on an amount of trade injury determined by 
arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, a free-standing arbitration provision. A November 9, 
2001, arbitral award determined that some $1.1 million in EU trade benefits are affected annually. 
Notwithstanding the arbitration, the EU, in January 2002, requested authorization from the DSB 
to impose countermeasures against the United States on the ground that the United States had not 
fully complied with its obligations in the case by the extended deadline. The EU proposed 
suspending concessions under the TRIPS Agreement so it could levy “a special fee from US 
nationals in connection with border measures concerning copyright goods.”57 The United States 
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 Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 
2010). The challenged provision was § 727 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-8, Div. A, 123 Stat. 
557. 
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 For further discussion of this provision, see CRS Report RS21107, Copyright Law’s “Small Business Exception”: 
Public Performance Exemptions for Certain Establishments, by Todd B. Tatelman. 
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 Recourse by the European Communities to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United States—Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/19 (Jan. 11, 2002). The fee would be applied to those U.S. right holders “that apply for 
action by the EU customs authorities to block pirated copyright goods.” European Commission, General Overview of 
Active WTO Dispute Settlement Cases Involving the EU as Complainant or Defendant and of Active Cases under the 
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asked for arbitration of the proposal, but the disputing parties later asked that the arbitration be 
suspended, with the understanding that it could be reactivated by either party after March 1, 
2002.58 
In April 2003, Congress appropriated $3.3 million for a “one-time only, lump-sum payment” to 
the EU to cover a three-year period of nullification and impairment of benefits in the dispute (P.L. 
108-11).59 The parties notified the WTO in late June 2003 that the payment, which will be made 
into a fund for EU performers, constitutes a temporary settlement of the dispute.60 They also 
agreed that the EU may request that the suspended arbitration be resumed any time after 
December 20, 2004, or if the United States fails to pay within 45 days after being notified that the 
fund has been established. 
Recent Developments 
In late November 2004, shortly before the three-year U.S.-EU agreement expired, the EU 
complained to the DSB that the United States had taken only minimal steps to secure the passage 
of legislation that would bring the United States into full compliance in the case.61 The EU has 
regularly raised the issue of U.S. noncompliance at DSB meetings, with the United States 
continuing to report to the DSB that it will work with Congress on the matter.62 During a July 
2009 meeting on bilateral trade relations held in Washington, DC, USTR Kirk and European 
Union Trade Commissioner Ashton “exchanged ideas on potential steps to address” this dispute, 
and “directed … [their] staffs to explore new options on this dispute in the coming weeks.”63 No 
agreement on resolving the dispute has yet been announced. As it has since the 2009 meeting with 
the EU, the United States reported to the DSB in February 2011 that, as well as working closely 
with Congress, it “will continue to confer with the European Union in order to reach a mutually 
satisfactory resolution of this matter.”64 
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Trade Barriers Regulation, at 26 (Feb. 22, 2011)[hereinafter EU Dispute Settlement Overview (Feb. 2011)], at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/may/tradoc_134652.pdf. 
58
 Communication from the Arbitrator, Recourse by the European Communities to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United 
States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/22 (Mar. 1, 2002). 
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 See H.Rept. 108-76 at 33, 92. As does the House report on the enacted appropriation, the House report on the House-
passed FY2004 appropriation for the USTR (H.R. 2799) points out that approval of the payment was intended as a 
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 Notification of a Mutually Satisfactory Temporary Arrangement, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act, WT/DS160/23 (June 26, 2003). 
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 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, Nov. 14 and 26, 2004, at 7, WT/DSB/M/178 (Jan. 17, 2005).  
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 E.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, Oct. 25, 2010, at 6, WT/DSB/M/288 (Dec. 15, 2010).  
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 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. and EU discuss ways forward on bilateral trade issues 
(last updated July 14, 2009), at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/july/eu-and-us-discuss-
ways-forward-bilateral-trade-issues. 
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 Status Report by the United States, Addendum, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 
WT/DS160/24/Add.74 (Feb. 11, 2011). 
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Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (Trademark 
Exclusion Involving Property Confiscated by Cuba)(DS176) 
This dispute, at the time referred to as the “Havana Club” case, involves a statute (P.L. 105-277, 
112 Stat. 2681-88), which prohibits the registration or enforcement in the United States, without 
the consent of the original owner or successors, of a trademark that is the same or substantially 
the same as one used in connection with a business or assets confiscated by the Cuban 
government. Challenged by the European Union (EU) in 1999, the law was ultimately found to 
violate national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in the TRIPS Agreement in that it 
limited the prohibition on registration and enforcement of rights to rights asserted by Cuba and 
Cuban nationals or their successors-in-interest. Panel and Appellate Body reports in the case were 
adopted January 2, 2002.65 
The original compliance period, as agreed upon by the United States and the EU, expired 
December 31, 2002; it was extended four times, also by agreement, most recently to June 30, 
2005.66 The United States did not comply by this date. Instead of agreeing to an extension of the 
deadline or, alternatively, requesting authorization to retaliate, the EU entered into an agreement 
with the United States regarding rights and procedures involving any future EU retaliation 
request.67 The EU agreed not to request authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions for 
the time being, but pledged to notify and consult with the United States before making any such 
request in the future. For its part, the United States agreed not to block any retaliation request by 
the EU on the ground that the request is outside the 30-day window provided for in Article 22.6 
of the DSU. The United States also retained the right to object to a proposed retaliation request 
and to refer the matter to arbitration. 
Recent Developments 
The EU, Cuba, and other WTO Members continue to raise the issue of U.S. noncompliance at 
DSB meetings,68 while the United States has reported to the DSB that legislative proposals that 
would implement the WTO ruling have been introduced in the House and Senate and that it will 
work with the Congress on legislative vehicles to resolve this matter.69 
A hearing on possible changes to U.S. law in light of the WTO decision was held by the House 
Judiciary Committee on March 3, 2010.70 H.R. 255 (Serrano), a 112th Congress bill, would repeal 
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 Modification of the Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, United States—Section 211 Omnibus 
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 Understanding between the European Communities and the United States, United States—Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/16 (July 1, 2005). 
68
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 See, e.g., Status Report by the United Status, Addendum, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
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Various 111th Congress bills would have either repealed or amended § 211. H.R. 1103 (Wexler) and S. 1234 
(Lieberman) would have amended § 211 to apply to all persons claiming rights in trademarks confiscated by Cuba, 
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§ 211 along with removing the current trade embargo on Cuba and making other statutory 
changes involving U.S.-Cuba relations. 
Antidumping Measures on Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan 
(DS184) 
This case involves a challenge to preliminary and final agency determinations issued in 1998 and 
1999 in an antidumping investigation of hot-rolled steel products from Japan. The panel, as 
upheld by the Appellate Body, found that the United States was in violation of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement because (1) U.S. law, specifically § 735(c)(5)(A) of the Tariff Act of 
1930, requires the Commerce Department to include dumping margins based in part on “facts 
available,” including those contained in petitions, in calculating the antidumping duty rate for 
companies not investigated individually in a case (“all others” rate); (2) the Commerce 
Department improperly applied facts available in calculating dumping margins for specific 
producers; and (3) the department had improperly excluded from the calculation of the normal 
value of the products under investigation certain home market sales to parties affiliated with the 
exporter involved.71 
The Appellate Body also ruled against the United States with respect to the ITC’s injury 
determination, reversing panel findings that the ITC had properly applied a captive production 
provision and that the agency had found a causal link between the dumped imports and material 
injury to the industry involved. With regard to Japan’s causation claim, however, the AB found 
that there was an insufficient factual record to allow completion of the required analysis.72 
The arbitrated compliance period in the case expired November 23, 2002. While Japan had 
threatened trade retaliation earlier in the month because it found it unlikely that the United States 
would comply with each element of the ruling by this date, the deadline was extended until 
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whatever their nationality. H.R. 1530 (Rangel) and H.R. 2272 (Rush) would have repealed § 211, removed the current 
trade embargo on Cuba, and made other statutory changes involving U.S.-Cuba commercial relations. H.R. 1531 
(Rangel) and S. 1089 (Baucus) would have repealed § 211, required related regulatory changes, and removed statutory 
restrictions on U.S.-Cuba trade in agricultural and medical goods. 
Bills to repeal or amend the provision were also introduced in the 110th and earlier Congresses: 110th Congress bills 
included H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. 624 (Rangel), which would have repealed § 211, as well as removed the current 
trade embargo on Cuba; H.R. 2819 (Rangel) and S. 1673 (Baucus), which would have repealed the statute along with 
removing certain other restrictions on trade with Cuba; S. 1806 (Leahy), which would have repealed the statute and 
required the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations as were necessary to carry out the repeal within 30 days after 
enactment; and H.R. 1306 (Wexler) and S. 749 (Nelson), which would have amended § 211 to apply to all persons 
claiming rights in trademarks confiscated by Cuba, whatever their nationality. In addition, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee held a hearing on Section 211 issues on July 13, 2004. See An Examination of Section 211 of the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=1261, for witness lists, testimony, 
and Members’ statements. 
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WT/DS184/R (Feb. 28, 2001)[hereinafter Hot-Rolled Steel Panel Report]; Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-
dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001)[hereinafter 
Hot-Rolled Steel AB Report]. 
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December 31, 2003, or the end of the 108th Congress, 1st Session (whichever was earlier), to 
permit the United States to comply fully with the panel and appellate reports in the case.73 
Administrative Compliance 
In partial implementation of the WTO rulings, the Commerce Department modified the test that it 
uses to determine which transactions are made by an exporter or producer to an affiliate at arm’s 
length and are therefore “in the ordinary course of trade.”74 The panel, as upheld by the Appellate 
Body, found that the test that the United States had applied in the dumping investigation at issue 
violated Article 2.1 of the Antidumping Agreement, which provides that a product “is to be 
considered dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal 
value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the 
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for 
consumption in the exporting country.”75 Sales that are outside the “ordinary course of trade” are 
thus to be excluded by national authorities when calculating normal value. 
Under past practice, the department considered sales of a product to an affiliate to be at arm’s 
length if the prices charged were on average at least 99.5% of the prices charged to unaffiliated 
comparison market customers. The department’s new test provides that for affiliate sales to be 
considered, the sales prices “must fall, on average, within a defined range, or band, around sales 
prices of the same or comparable merchandise sold by that exporter or producer to all unaffiliated 
customers. The band applied for this purpose will provide that the overall ratio calculated for an 
affiliate be between 98 percent and 102 percent, inclusive, of prices to unaffiliated customers.”76 
According to the department, the regulatory revision “is consistent with the view, expressed by 
the WTO Appellate Body, that rules aimed at preventing the distortion of normal value through 
sales between affiliates should reflect, ‘even-handedly,’ that ‘both high and low-price sales 
between affiliates might not be ‘in the ordinary course of trade.’”77 The department stated that the 
new methodology would be used to implement the WTO findings regarding the Japan hot-rolled 
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steel AD proceeding, and applied in all investigations and reviews initiated on or after November 
23, 2002.78 
On December 3, 2002, the department announced a new dumping determination in the AD 
proceeding at issue, stating that in implementation of the WTO rulings and recommendations, it 
had recalculated dumping margins for three affected Japanese producers using the new 
methodology; addressed issues related to the use of adverse facts available; and recalculated the 
all-others rate based on the new rates for the respondent companies.79 The recalculations resulted 
in reduced dumping margins for the three companies as well for all other exporters. 
Legislative Compliance 
As noted earlier, the dispute panel, as upheld by the Appellate Body, concluded that the United 
States was in violation of its WTO obligations because it used dumping margins based in part on 
facts available in determining the “all others” rate in antidumping proceedings. Article 9.4 of the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement provides, in pertinent part, that the “all others” rate may not 
exceed the weighted average margin established with respect to individually investigated 
producers or exporters, excluding any zero and de minimis margin and margins established on the 
basis of facts available.80 Section 735(c)(5)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930 states that, for purposes 
of preliminary and final dumping determinations, the estimated dumping margin for producers 
that are not investigated individually “shall be an amount equal to the weighted average of the 
estimated weighted average dumping margins established for exporters and producers 
individually investigated, excluding any zero and de minimis margins, and any margins 
determined entirely under section 776.”81 Section 776 of the Tariff Act governs the use of facts 
available by the DOC and ITC in making dumping, subsidy, and injury determinations.82 The 
WTO panel, as affirmed on appeal, concluded that § 735(c)(5)(A) is inconsistent with Article 9.4 
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because it requires DOC to consider dumping margins based in part on facts available in 
determining the all-others rate, while the cited WTO article was found to require the exclusion of 
dumping margins based either in whole or in part on such facts.83 
Absent legislative compliance by the United States, the December 2003 deadline referred to 
earlier was extended twice, most recently to July 31, 2005.84 The deadline lapsed without U.S. 
action. In an understanding between the disputing parties reached earlier in July 2005, Japan 
stated that it would not request authorization to retaliate at the time but might choose to do so in 
the future.85 
Recent Developments 
No legislation has been introduced to amend § 735(c)(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930 since the 109th 
Congress. H.R. 2473 (Shaw), 109th Cong., 1st Sess., would have amended § 735(c)(5) to remove 
the word “entirely” each time it appears in the provision, thus enabling the Department of 
Commerce to exclude dumping margins based in whole or in part on facts available in 
determining the “all others” rate, as called for by the WTO decision. Although the text of H.R. 
2473 was listed for possible inclusion in 109th Congress miscellaneous tariff legislation,86 the bill 
was not made part of the tariff legislation nor was it acted upon as stand-alone legislation.  
Japan continues to seek legislative action,87 as the United States continues to state its support for 
legislative amendments that would achieve full compliance in the case.88 The United States has 
also submitted a proposal to the Doha Round Negotiating Group on Rules that Article 9.4 of the 
Antidumping Agreement be clarified to allow the invalidated practice.89 No revisions or 
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In presenting its proposal to WTO negotiating partners, the United States has explained that it interpreted Article 9.4 of 
the Antidumping Agreement as providing that only margins based entirely on facts available are to be excluded from 
calculating the all-others rate ceiling because “the United States believed that this was a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute and because, in the United States’ experience, some level of facts available is often necessary to determine a 
company’s dumping margin.” U.S. Communication, supra, at 1. In the U.S. view, whether the “facts available” data 
used with respect to a firm are small or substantial, “the resulting margin represents the best estimate of the level of 
dumping by that particular company” and it is thus “appropriate to use such a margin when establishing a duty rate for 
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clarifications of Article 9.4, however, were included in the draft texts of proposed revisions to the 
Antidumping Agreement circulated by the Chair of the Negotiating Group in November 2007 and 
December 2008.90 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (DS217/DS234) 
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) of 2000, also known as the Byrd 
Amendment, required that duties collected under an existing antidumping or countervailing duty 
order be distributed annually to petitioners and interested parties in the underlying antidumping or 
countervailing duty proceeding.91 Payments were available for “qualifying expenditures” in 
specified categories (e.g., manufacturing facilities or equipment) incurred by the petitioners and 
interested parties after the applicable antidumping or countervailing duty order was issued. To be 
eligible, petitioners and interested parties, referred to in the statute as “affected domestic 
producers,” must also have remained in operation. Although the statute was held WTO-
inconsistent in January 2003 and repealed, effective October 2005, by P.L. 109-171, it remains 
the target of authorized sanctions by complainants European Union and Japan due to continued 
payments to U.S. firms under the CDSOA program. 
Original WTO Complaints 
Eleven WTO members challenged CDSOA shortly after its enactment in October 2000 as 
violative of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), and other WTO obligations. The complainants 
based their argument in part on the prohibitions in Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement 
and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement against Members’ taking any “specific action against” 
dumping and subsidization, respectively, except for action taken in accordance with the GATT 
1994 as interpreted by, as appropriate, the Antidumping or SCM Agreement.92 Two complaints 
were filed: DS217, filed jointly by Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European Union (EU), India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Thailand; and DS234, filed jointly by Canada and Mexico. 
The WTO panel, which considered both complaints at the same time, found that the CDSOA did 
create an impermissible “specific action against” dumping and subsidization and that it provided 
a financial incentive for domestic producers to file or support antidumping and countervailing 
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duty petitions, thereby undermining the industry support requirements in the Antidumping and 
SCM Agreements. At the same time, the panel rejected complainants’ argument that the act would 
make it more difficult for the United States to enter into subsidy and price undertakings with 
foreign governments allowing the suspension of investigations (“suspension agreements”), along 
with Mexico’s claim that the act constituted a subsidy in and of itself.93 The Appellate Body 
upheld the panel’s finding that the statute created a “specific action against” dumping and 
subsidization not allowed under WTO agreements, but reversed the panel on its conclusion 
regarding industry support requirements.94 The reports were adopted January 27, 2003, and the 
compliance period was subsequently determined by arbitration to expire December 27, 2003.95 
Requests to Impose Sanctions 
Because the United States did not comply by the December 2003 deadline, eight complaining 
Members—Brazil, Chile, EU, India, Japan, Korea, Canada, and Mexico—asked the WTO in 
January 2004 for authorization to impose retaliatory measures.96 The United States objected to the 
requests, sending them to arbitration.97 The remaining three complainants—Australia, Indonesia, 
and Thailand—agreed to give the United States until December 27, 2004, to comply.98 
In awards issued August 31, 2004, the WTO Arbitrator (a panel of three) determined that each of 
the eight Members could impose countermeasures on an annual basis in an amount equal to 72% 
of the CDSOA disbursements for the most recent year for which official U.S. data are available 
relating to antidumping and countervailing duties paid on imports from the Member at that time.99 
The Arbitrator stated that the disbursements “operate, in economic terms, as subsidies that may 
generate import substitution production”100 and used an economic model to determine the level of 
nullification or impairment of benefits, or what the Arbitrator characterized as “a value of trade” 
affected by application of the CDSOA.101 The Arbitrator also made clear that each Member would 
need to ensure that the total value of U.S. trade subject to the proposed duty increase does not 
exceed the total value of trade determined to constitute the level of nullification or impairment or 
else propose other forms of suspending concessions to the DSB that are less likely to have trade 
effects exceeding this level in terms of value of U.S. exports to the country involved. 
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The eight complainants received formal authorization from the DSB to impose retaliatory 
measures in late 2004.102 The EU and Canada began to impose countermeasures in the form of 
higher tariffs and surcharges on selected U.S. products, respectively, as of May 1, 2005.103 
Mexico began to impose $20.9 million in retaliatory tariffs effective August 18, 2005.104 In 
addition, Japan imposed additional tariffs of 15% on 15 categories of U.S. goods as of September 
1, 2005.105 
U.S. Judicial and Legislative Action 
In April 2006, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled that the CDSOA did not apply to 
imports from Canada or Mexico,106 and on September 28, 2006, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection announced that it was withholding FY2006 and subsequent years’ distributions on 
imports from the two countries pending the outcome of any appeal.107 Canada allowed its 
retaliatory tariffs to terminate as of April 30, 2006.108 Mexico, after a month’s lapse, imposed 
increased tariffs on U.S. dairy products from September 18 through October 31, 2006.109 These 
tariffs surcharges have not been reimposed. 
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A provision repealing the CDSOA as of October 1, 2005, but providing for the distribution of 
“duties on entries of goods made and filed before October 1, 2007,” was enacted in the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, signed by the President on February 8, 2006.110 While collection of 
antidumping and countervailing duties for purposes of CDSOA disbursal has thus ceased, duties 
will continue to be available for disbursement until all relevant customs entries before September 
1, 2007, are liquidated, that is, the final assessment of duties on these entries is made. On May 29, 
2009, U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued its most recent annual notice of intent to 
distribute these funds.111 In addition, Congress has routinely included provisions in annual 
appropriations legislation directing the Commerce Department and the Office of the USTR to 
conduct negotiations in the WTO “to recognize the right of members to distribute monies 
collected from antidumping and countervailing duties.”112 
Following the 2006 enactment, the United States informed the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) that it had taken the actions necessary to implement the WTO rulings.113 Although 
complaining Members expressed support for the repeal, Members also stated their concerns that 
the requirement that duties be distributed through 2007 and possibly after this date would prevent 
the United States from complying fully with its WTO obligations in the case.114 
Recent Developments 
Although WTO Members have regularly called on the United States to cease payments under the 
CDSOA program,115 no Member has formally challenged the compatibility of the 2006 statute 
with U.S. WTO obligations. The EU and Japan are continuing to impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. 
products based on payments to affected U.S. producers under the CDSOA program. As noted 
earlier, authorized retaliation may not exceed 72% of the antidumping and countervailing duties 
collected on EU and Japanese products, respectively, that is disbursed in the most recent year for 
which data is available.  
After having reduced its annual level of retaliation for several years due to reduced payments 
under the statute, the EU in May 2010 raised its annual amount of retaliation from $16.31 million 
to $95.38 million in trade, adding 19 items to the list of U.S. goods subject to the EU’s 15% tariff 
                                                             
(...continued) 
Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, Sept. 28, 2006, at 9, WT/DSB/M/220 (Nov. 2, 2006). 
110
 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, P.L. 109-171, § 7601. Section 7701 of the act provides that Title VII, which contains 
the CDSOA-related provisions, “shall take effect as if enacted on October 1, 2005.” 
111
 Distribution of Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset to Affected Domestic Producers, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,814-
25,969 (May 29, 2009). 
112
 The mandate for FY2009 currently appears in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-8, Division B, Title 
I, Title IV. See also the pending appropriations bill for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, and Science, and 
Related Agencies for FY2010, H.R. 2847, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009), Title I, Title IV, as passed the House and as 
reported in the Senate (S.Rept. 111-34). 
Although the USTR submitted a proposal of this type to the pertinent Doha Round negotiating group in 2004, a 
provision addressing this issue has not been included in the draft negotiating texts. See Communication from the United 
States, Three Issues Identified for Discussion by the Negotiating Group on Rules, at 2, TN/RL/W/153 (Apr. 26, 2004); 
2007 Draft Rules Text and 2008 Draft Rules Text, supra note 90. 
113
 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, Feb. 17, 2006, at 5-10, WT/DSB/M/205 (Mar. 31, 2006). 
114
 Id. 
115
 See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, Oct. 25, 2010, at 10-11,WT/DSB/M/288 (Dec. 15, 2010). 
See also EU Dispute Settlement Overview (Feb. 2011), supra note 57, at 23.  
WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases 
 
Congressional Research Service 26 
surcharge, primarily in apparel categories.116 The increase is based in large part on the 
disbursement in 2009 of antidumping duties collected on low-enriched uranium from the EU.117 
In September 2010, Japan further reduced its level of retaliation from $16.54 million to $8.05 
million, lowering its duty surcharge from 9.6% to 4.1% on U.S. ball bearings and tapered roller 
bearings, the two products subject to Japan’s retaliatory measure.118 
A December 2010 enactment, however, limits funds currently available for continued payments 
under the CDSOA program. Section 822 of the Claims Resolution Act of 2010, P.L. 111-291, a 
provision included in the public law as a funding offset, provides that no payments may be 
distributed under the CDSOA with respect to entries of any goods that, on the date of enactment, 
that is, December 8, 2010, are (1) not liquidated and (2) not in litigation or not under an order of 
liquidation from the Commerce Department. 
Subsidies on Upland Cotton (DS267) 
In September 2002, Brazil requested consultations with the United States regarding U.S. statutes 
and programs that Brazil claimed provided prohibited and actionable subsidies to U.S. producers, 
users, and exporters of upland cotton.119 Brazil alleged violations of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), and 
national treatment obligations in the GATT. It requested a panel in February 2003, adding a claim 
based on subsidy obligations in GATT Article XVI.120 The panel was established in March 2003; 
panelists were appointed in May of that year. 
WTO Members have made commitments in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to reduce, and in 
some cases eliminate, domestic support in favor of agricultural producers and export subsidies on 
agricultural products.121 The commitments made by each Member to limit domestic support and 
export subsidization are contained in the Member’s Schedule, which is attached to and considered 
an integral part of the Agreement.122 “Scheduled products” are those products for which a WTO 
Member has made domestic support and export subsidy reduction commitments. The United 
States did not schedule any export subsidy reduction commitments regarding upland cotton. 
The types of export subsidies for which reduction commitments are made are listed in Article 9.1 
of the Agreement. Members may not provide any export subsidy listed in Article 9.1 to an 
“unscheduled product” or to a “scheduled” product in excess of the Member’s scheduled 
reduction commitments. If the Member does so it is in violation of Articles 3.3 and 8 of the 
Agreement. In addition, Article 10.1 prohibits Members from applying any subsidy that is not 
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listed in Article 9.1 “in a manner which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of 
export subsidy commitments.” 
Alleged violations of the Agriculture Agreement may be challenged under WTO dispute 
settlement procedures. Agricultural subsidies may also be challenged under the SCM Agreement, 
which defines the term “subsidy,” prohibits export subsidies and subsidies contingent on the use 
of domestic over imported products “except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture,” and 
makes any subsidy fitting the Agreement definition “actionable” if the subsidy is specific to an 
industry and causes “adverse effects” to the interests of another WTO Member.123 Among these 
adverse effects is what the Agreement refers to as “serious prejudice,” an effect that will be found 
where there is, inter alia, “a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared 
with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price 
suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market.”124 The SCM Agreement contains 
timelines for dispute settlement proceedings that are shorter than those in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding and in general contemplates expedited compliance with adverse WTO 
decisions in disputes arising under the Agreement.  
Resort to WTO dispute settlement had been temporarily limited by Article 13 of the Agriculture 
Agreement—the now-expired “Peace Clause”—which provided that certain domestic support 
measures and export subsidies that conformed fully with enumerated requirements in the 
Agriculture Agreement were “exempt from actions” under specified subsidy-related provisions in 
the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement through the end of the “implementation period,” that is, 
the end of the nine-year period following the date the Agriculture Agreement entered into force 
(January 1, 1995), or December 31, 2003. The United States unsuccessfully argued in the case 
that certain of its agricultural programs were covered by this provision. 
Panel and Appellate Body Reports 
In a report issued September 8, 2004, the WTO panel found that the United States was 
maintaining export subsidy programs and providing payments under domestic support programs 
in violation of the Agriculture Agreement and the SCM Agreement.125 
First, the panel found that three U.S. export credit guarantee programs in effect at the time 
constituted export subsidies for purposes of WTO obligations because the programs were 
provided at premium rates that were “inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and 
losses” of the programs.126 The panel looked to the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies set out in 
Annex I of the SCM Agreement, which includes export credit guarantee programs fitting this 
description in item (j) of the List.127 The cited programs were (1) the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102), providing export credit 
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guarantees for up to three years; (2) the CCC Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee Program 
(GSM-103), providing export credit guarantees for up to 10 years; and (3) the Supplier Credit 
Guarantee Program (SCGP), allowing export guarantees for 180 days and in some cases up to 360 
days. 
The panel found that the premiums charged for the U.S. programs would not insure adequate 
financial coverage for several reasons: (1) the existence of a statutory 1% fee cap in connection 
with GSM-102 and SCGP transactions; (2) the fact that premiums were not risk-based either as to 
country risk or the creditworthiness of the borrower in individual transactions; and (3) even 
though the premiums charged offset the programs’ long-term costs and losses “to some degree,” 
coverage was “effectively ensure[d]” by the U.S. Government’s subsidy estimates and re-
estimates “and ultimately the availability of United States government funds to cover any costs to 
government.”128 The panel further found that, to the extent that these programs applied to exports 
of upland cotton and other unscheduled agricultural commodities supported under the programs, 
and to exports of rice (a scheduled commodity), the export subsidies were being applied in a 
manner that circumvented U.S. export subsidy commitments in the Agriculture Agreement in 
violation of Article 10 of the Agreement. As these programs did not conform fully to export 
subsidy obligations in the Agreement, they were found not to be covered by the Peace Clause and 
thus subject to challenge. The panel went on to find that these programs were prohibited export 
subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. 
Second, the panel faulted the “Step 2” program, authorized in § 1207(a) of the Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act of 2002, P.L. 107-171 (“2002 farm bill”), 7 U.S.C. § 7937(a), as it applied 
both to exporters and domestic users of upland cotton. To the extent that the program provided for 
payments to exporters for their purchase of higher priced upland cotton, it was found to constitute 
an export subsidy that was not scheduled by the United States in the Agreement on Agriculture 
and was therefore inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Agreement. As such, this part of 
the Step 2 program was found not to be covered by the Peace Clause and thus also subject to 
challenge. The panel then found that the program constituted a prohibited export subsidy under 
the Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. In addition, the panel found that the Step 2 program, 
insofar as it provided for payments to domestic users of upland cotton, qualified as a subsidy 
contingent on the use of domestic over imported products and was thus prohibited under Article 
3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
Third, the panel found that payments under various U.S. domestic support programs, including 
counter-cyclical payments (CCP), market loss assistance payments (MLA), marketing loan 
program payments, and Step 2 payments for U.S. cotton producers, were measures that granted 
sufficient amounts of support to upland cotton to exempt them from the Peace Clause.129 The 
panel then found that the payments under the four cited programs—which it characterized as 
“mandatory price-contingent subsidies”—caused serious prejudice to Brazil’s interests in the 
form of significant price suppression in the world upland cotton market for purposes of Articles 
5(c) and Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement. 
At the time, CCP payments, market loan program payments, and Step 2 payments were 
authorized in the 2002 farm bill, while the authority for the MLA payments had expired. Among 
other findings, however, the panel determined that an agricultural program could be challenged in 
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the WTO even though it had expired so long as the program was in force during the Agriculture 
Agreement implementation period (i.e., between 1995 and the end of 2003) and continued to have 
an adverse effect on the complaining Member. This finding allowed Brazil to challenge MLA 
payments and flexibility contract payments (FCP), the legislative basis of which had lapsed in 
2002. Brazil was unable, however, to show serious prejudice from the FCP program. 
The panel recommended that the prohibited subsidies be removed “without delay” and specified 
that this be done at the latest within six months of the date of adoption of the panel report or July 
1, 2005, whichever was earlier.130 The panel cited Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, which 
requires that where an export subsidy is found, the panel recommend expeditious removal and 
specify a time period for such action. The panel also recommended that the adverse effects of the 
actionable subsidies, or alternatively, the subsidies themselves, be removed, as provided in Article 
7.8 of the SCM Agreement, that is, upon adoption of the panel report.131 
The panel’s finding of serious prejudice for the actionable subsidies also implicated a deadline in 
Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement affecting requests for authorization to impose retaliatory 
measures. Provided there is no agreement between the disputing parties on compensation, Article 
7.9 accords a prevailing Member the right to make such a request in the event the defending 
Member “has not taken appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects of the subsidy or 
withdraw the subsidy within six months” after the date the panel or Appellate Body report is 
adopted.132 
The United States and Brazil appealed the panel report, and the Appellate Body, in a March 5, 
2005, report largely upheld the panel.133 The reports were adopted on March 21, 2005.134 This 
action effectively established a July 1, 2005, deadline for removal of the prohibited subsidies and 
an Article 7.9 deadline of September 21, 2005, with respect to the actionable subsidies. 
The United States told the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, on April 20, 2005, that it would 
implement the WTO rulings, but that it would need a reasonable period to comply and that it had 
begun to consider its options for doing so.135 Brazil complained that the U.S. statement was not 
sufficiently detailed and made reference to the panel’s recommended time periods for 
compliance.136 The European Union noted that because the subsidies at issue were found to 
infringe both the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture, the United States was 
entitled to a “reasonable period of time” to comply with Agriculture Agreement, that is, a 
compliance period determined on an ad hoc basis, as ordinarily available under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. 
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Responses of the United States and Brazil 
In response to the WTO finding that fees charged by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
guarantee programs must be risk-based, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
announced on June 30, 2005, that, as of July 1, 2005, CCC would use a risk-based fee structure 
for both the GSM-102 and SCGP program.137 USDA also announced that CCC would no longer 
accept applications for payment guarantees under the GSM-103 program. 
Because prohibited export subsidies had not been removed by July 1, 2005, Brazil requested that 
the DSB meet on July 15, 2005, to consider its request for authorization to impose 
countermeasures against the United States. Brazil sought to suspend tariff concessions as well as 
obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) until the United States withdrew the 
exports subsidies identified by the WTO.138 Brazil proposed sanctions in an amount 
corresponding to (1) the Step 2 payments made in the most recent concluded marketing year and 
(2) the total of exporter applications received under the GSM-102, GSM-103 and SGCP 
programs, for all unscheduled commodities and for rice, for the most recent concluded fiscal year, 
estimating the annual total for both to be $3 billion.139 
On July 5, 2005, USDA announced that, to further comply with the WTO decision, it was sending 
proposed statutory changes to Congress to eliminate the Step 2 cotton program, remove the 1% 
cap on origination fees under the GSM-102 program, and terminate the GSM-103 program.140 
According to USDA: 
Repealing the Step 2 program would remove both the export subsidies and import 
substitution subsidies that the WTO cited and address issues related to suppression of cotton 
prices in world markets. Eliminating the one-percent fee cap would make the Export Credit 
Guarantee Program more risk-based. Terminating the GSM-103 program would reinforce the 
recent U.S. decision to stop using longer-term export credit guarantees.141 
On the same day, Brazil and the United States notified the DSB that they had entered into a 
procedural agreement covering the implementation phase of the dispute.142 The agreement also 
recognized both the changes to the CCC programs announced June 30, 2005, and the legislative 
proposal sent to Congress to repeal the Step 2 program. As provided in the agreement, the United 
States requested arbitration of Brazil’s retaliation proposal; the DSB referred the matter to 
arbitration at its July 15, 2005, meeting;143 and the two countries, on August 17, 2005, requested 
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that the arbitration be suspended.144 The agreement also provided that Brazil could request an 
Article 21.5 compliance panel at any time after the July 15, 2005, meeting. 
In addition, because the United States had not complied with its WTO obligations regarding the 
actionable subsidies by September 21, 2005, Brazil shortly thereafter proposed to suspend tariff 
concessions as well as obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and the GATS in the annual 
amount of $1.037 billion.145 The United States objected to the proposal, and the matter was 
referred to arbitration.146 On November 21, 2005, the parties requested that the arbitration be 
suspended, “noting that the United States reaffirmed” at the November 18, 2005, DSB meeting 
“its commitment to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute, and 
in light of the preference for WTO-consistent solutions mutually acceptable to the parties to a 
dispute set out in DSU Article 3.7.”147 
Congress subsequently repealed the Step 2 program, effective August 1, 2006.148 
Compliance Panel Proceeding 
On August 21, 2006, Brazil requested an Article 21.5 compliance panel, claiming WTO violations 
stemming from the U.S. failure to repeal the Step 2 program as of end of the six-month period set 
out in Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement (i.e., by September 21, 2005), the continued payments 
under the marketing loan and counter-cyclical programs authorized in the 2002 farm bill, and 
continued WTO-related defects in the export credit guarantee programs at issue in the case. 
In December 2007, the compliance issued a report adverse to the United States with respect to 
both the marketing loan and CCP payments and the GSM-102 program.149 
First, the panel found that payments under the marketing loan and counter-cyclical programs 
authorized in the 2002 farm bill resulted in significant price suppression, which constituted 
present serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil in violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the 
SCM Agreement. The panel thus found that the United States was in violation of its obligation 
under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement to take “appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects 
of … or withdraw the subsidy.” 
Second, regarding GSM-102 export credit guarantees provided after July 1, 2005 (the deadline set 
by the original panel), the panel found that Brazil had established that the revised GSM-102 
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program constituted an export subsidy on the ground that the program continued to be provided 
against premiums that were inadequate to cover its long-term operating costs and losses and that 
the program thus qualified as such under item (j) of the Illustrative List.150 The panel further 
found that United States was in violation of its obligations in the Agreement on Agriculture in 
applying export subsidies in a manner that circumvented its export subsidy commitments 
regarding various unscheduled products (e.g., cotton, oilseeds, protein meals) as well as three 
scheduled products (rice, poultry meat, and rice).151 By providing export subsidies both to 
unscheduled products and to scheduled products in excess of its reduction commitments, the 
United States was also found to be granting prohibited subsidies in violation of the SCM 
Agreement.152 
The panel based its conclusion that the GSM-102 program constituted an export subsidy on the 
following factors:  
(a)  The US Government continues to project that new GSM 102 export credit guarantees 
issued under the new fee schedule will be provided at a net cost to the Government. 
(b)  GSM 102 fees are well below the OECD MPR’s [minimum premium rates], which we 
consider to provide an informed appraisal of the level of fees necessary to cover the long-
term, operating costs and losses of an export credit guarantee programme; 
(c)  Elements of the structure, design and operation of the GSM 102 programme indicate 
that the programme is not designed to cover the long term operating costs and losses of that 
programme.153 
The compliance panel’s conclusion in (c) resulted from the following considerations: “the CCC’s 
access to funds from the US Treasury, which facilitates the functioning of the programme”; “the 
fact that GSM 102 fees do not vary with foreign obligor risk”; and “the fact that the one percent 
fee cap has not been repealed and in our view prevents the adoption of risk-based fees (notably 
due to the insufficient ‘scaling’ of GSM 102 fees [as risk increases]).”154 The panel ultimately 
found that the United States had failed to bring its measures into conformity with the Agreement 
on Agriculture and to “withdraw the subsidy without delay” as recommended by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
Both the United States and Brazil appealed. In a report issued June 2, 2008, the Appellate Body 
largely upheld the compliance panel, though taking issues with an aspect of the panel’s 
methodology regarding the existence of export subsidization.155 The Appellate Body reversed the 
panel’s intermediate conclusion that the GSM-102 program would be run at a net cost to the 
government on the ground that the panel had not accorded sufficient weight to data provided by 
the United States concerning re-estimates of initial subsidy estimates for the three challenged 
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programs for 1992-2006.156 The United States had argued that the re-estimates demonstrated that 
the programs “were in fact not provided at a net loss to the US Government even before the 
United States took any measures to comply with the DSB recommendations” in the case.157 At the 
same time, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s ultimate conclusion that the revised program 
fell within the scope of item (j) and thus constituted an export subsidy, determining that the 
panel’s findings on the structure, design, and operation of the revised GSM 102 program provided 
“a sufficient evidentiary basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that … [it] operates 
at a loss.”158  
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body adopted the reports on June 25, 2008. 
2008 Farm Bill Amendments 
On June 18, 2008, a week before the compliance panel and appellate reports were adopted, 
President George W. Bush signed the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 
(“2008 farm bill”), a statute containing several provisions relevant to the pending dispute. Section 
3101 of the act made statutory changes affecting U.S. export credit guarantee programs, changes 
that the bill Managers believed “satisfy U.S. commitments to comply with the Brazil cotton case 
with regard to the export credit programs.”159 The act repealed the GSM-103 intermediate export 
credit guarantee program and the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP)160 and eliminated 
the 1% cap on origination fees under the GSM-102 program, a requirement contained in 7 U.S.C. 
§ 5622(b).161 While leaving the GSM-102 program intact, Congress placed new requirements on 
the Secretary of Agriculture in administering the program, including “work[ing] with industry to 
ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that risk-based fees associated with the guarantees 
cover, but do not exceed, the operating costs of and losses over the long term.”162 The phrase 
“long term” is defined in the statute as “a period of 10 or more years.”163 In addition, Congress 
directed the Commodity Credit Corporation to make available for GSM-102 programs each year 
through FY2012 a maximum $5.5 billion, or “the amount of guarantees that can be supported by 
$40 billion in budget authority (plus any budget authority for prior years)—whichever amount is 
less.”164  
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In addition, Congress reauthorized counter-cyclical payments and marketing assistance loans for 
cotton and other commodities for the 2008-2012 crop years.165 As discussed earlier, these two 
programs, as authorized in the 2002 farm bill, were successfully challenged by Brazil as 
actionable subsidies in the pending WTO case and are the basis of one of Brazil’s retaliation 
requests. 
Arbitration of Brazil’s Retaliation Request 
In August 2008, following the DSB’s adoption of the compliance panel and Appellate Body 
reports finding the United States not to be in full compliance in the case, Brazil requested that the 
arbitrations on its retaliation proposals be resumed. Brazil lowered its retaliation requests in 
March 2009 to approximately $2.5 billion consisting of three components: (1) a one-time 
countermeasure of $350 million based on payments made under the repealed Step 2 program 
during the 13-month period between the compliance deadline of July 1, 2005, set by the original 
panel, and August 1, 2006, the date that the statutory repeal entered into force; (2) an annual 
countermeasure of approximately $1.2 billion for prohibited subsidies resulting from the GSM-
102 export credit guarantee program; and (3) an annual countermeasure of approximately $1 
billion based on actionable subsidies resulting from marketing loan and countercyclical 
payments.166 
In an arbitral proceeding involving prohibited subsidies, the Arbitrator determines whether the 
proposed countermeasures are “appropriate,” that is, not “disproportionate in light of the fact that 
the subsidies … are prohibited.”167 Where actionable subsidies are involved, the Arbitrator 
determines whether the proposed countermeasures are “commensurate with the degree and nature 
of the adverse effects determined to exist.”168 
On August 31, 2009, the Arbitrator issued two reports—the first addressing retaliation for 
prohibited subsidies, the second for actionable subsidies.169 The Arbitrator rejected Brazil’s 
request for a one-time payment based on the Step 2 program; lowered the other amounts proposed 
by Brazil to a total $297.4 million annually for both prohibited and actionable subsidies (based on 
the FY2006 figures); and set out conditions under which Brazil could suspend WTO obligations 
involving U.S. services and intellectual property, or “cross-retaliate.” Among other findings, the 
Arbitrator rejected U.S. arguments that, with the expiration of the statutory authority for the 
marketing loan and countercyclical payments at issue in the underlying WTO proceedings, Brazil 
could not pursue countermeasures for serious prejudice resulting from payments under these 
programs. The Arbitrator’s decisions are final and not subject to appeal. 
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Retaliation for Prohibited Subsidies 
In examining Brazil’s request for countermeasures for the prohibited subsidies, the Arbitrator first 
concluded that there was no legal basis for Brazil’s request for a one-time payment based on past 
disbursements under the Step 2 program. The Arbitrator found that countermeasures are an 
exceptional temporary remedy aimed at inducing compliance and that the United States had in 
fact complied with respect to this program.170 
Second, the Arbitrator determined that Brazil could suspend concessions amounting to $147.4 
annually for the continued operation of the GSM-102 export credit guarantee program, based on 
GSM-102 transactions in FY2006. As summarized by the Arbitrator, Brazil determined the trade-
distorting impact of the program and thus the level of “appropriate” countermeasures for the 
prohibited subsidy by determining “the interest rate discounts secured by creditworthy and 
uncreditworthy foreign obligors backed by GSM-102 guarantees and estimating the additional 
export sales obtained by US exporters as a result of these discounts.”171 Brazil referred to these 
two factors as the “interest rate subsidy” and “additionality.” The Arbitrator modified Brazil’s 
calculations, however, “in order to more accurately calculate the trade-distorting impact of the 
GSM-102 programme on Brazil” and, taking into account other determinations it had made, 
reduced Brazil’s original proposal to the figure stated above.172  
The Arbitrator found that $147.4 figure was variable, however, and could change annually 
depending on the total of amount of GSM-102 transactions in the most recently concluded fiscal 
year. The Arbitrator set out a formula that Brazil would need to use to determine the amount of 
permissible sanctions for a given year due to these payments, noting that “the United States does 
not dispute that it would be permissible for the level of appropriate countermeasures to be 
determined through a formula, provided that this formula was sufficiently well defined so as to 
make it applicable in a transparent and predictable manner.”173 
Third, the Arbitrator determined that Brazil could cross-retaliate in order to remedy the prohibited 
subsidy resulting from the GSM-102 payments, but set conditions on Brazil’s use of this remedy. 
The Arbitrator stated that “Brazil has at its disposal a sufficient range of imports of goods, 
including consumer goods, from the United States so as to enable it to suspend concessions in the 
area of trade in goods alone, without causing itself such economic harm so as to render such 
suspension ‘not practicable or effective,’” the standard set out in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, taking into account the cumulated $294.7 million in countermeasures the 
Arbitrator had determined Brazil could impose for both prohibited and actionable subsidies in this 
case.174 Based on Brazil’s imports of consumer goods for 2007, the Arbitrator identified at least 
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$409.7 million of such goods that could be the subject of countermeasures.175 For certain 
consumer goods (food, medical products, and arms), the Arbitrator adopted a benchmark of 20%, 
finding that a U.S. import share of the good of less than this amount “constitutes a reasonable 
threshold by which to estimate the extent to which Brazil may be able to find alternative sources 
of supply” for the product.176 This annual goods “threshold” is to be updated, however, under a 
formula set out by the Arbitrator, to take into account any change in Brazil’s total imports of U.S. 
consumer goods for the same year for which the annual countermeasures are determined.177 
Under the decision, if the total level of countermeasures for prohibited and actionable subsidies 
that Brazil is entitled to for a given year exceeds the updated goods threshold for that year, Brazil 
may cross-retaliate, that is, suspend WTO obligations involving U.S. services, intellectual 
property rights, or both, in excess of the goods threshold to the full amount of permissible 
sanctions for the year. If permissible sanctions do not exceed the goods threshold, however, Brazil 
may only suspend concessions on trade in goods. 
Retaliation for Actionable Subsidies 
The United States preliminarily argued in the arbitration involving actionable subsidies that, with 
the expiration of the 2002 farm bill, payments would no longer be made under the marketing loan 
and countercyclical payments programs at issue in Brazil’s WTO challenge and that, because the 
challenged measures were removed, there was no longer a legal basis for Brazil to impose 
countermeasures with regard to these payments. Brazil argued that because these programs were 
reauthorized in the 2008 farm bill in a manner that did not materially change them as they applied 
to cotton, the problematic payments would continue under the same conditions and criteria as the 
payments subject to the earlier WTO proceedings. Until the United States achieved what the 
WTO Appellate Body deemed “substantial compliance,” Brazil claimed that it had the right to 
pursue countermeasures for continuing present serious prejudice. The United States responded 
that Brazil’s conclusions about payments that might be made under the 2008 farm bill and their 
price effect were speculative. 
In assessing whether the United States had complied, the Arbitrator quoted from the Appellate 
Body report referred to by Brazil, in which the Appellate Body had stated that for purposes of 
determining whether a WTO Member has complied in a case, “substantive compliance is 
required, rather than formal removal of the inconsistent measure.”178 Informed by this principle, 
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the Arbitrator compared the 2002 and 2008 farm bills and concluded that the replacement of the 
2002 provisions with new measures that are “essentially the same” as those found to be WTO-
inconsistent was not a basis for finding that the United States had complied, if the United States 
had not shown that “the inconsistencies that were the object of the [prior WTO] proceedings have 
been remedied.”179 Seemingly alluding to possible activity under the reauthorized CCP and 
marketing loan provisions, the Arbitrator noted that “any uncertainty about what might happen in 
the future” could not dissuade the Arbitrator from “assessing the adverse effects determined to 
exist in relation to a measure which did exist and which, on the facts, continues to exist.”180 The 
Arbitrator thus stated that “although the legal basis for the granting of ML and CCPs has been 
modified, such payments continue to be offered and may continue to be made under a new legal 
basis.”181 The Arbitrator concluded that, to the extent that it was entitled to review whether 
compliance has been achieved in a case (a task it earlier admitted was not normally the task of 
arbitrators), it would not have adequate grounds to conclude that the United States had 
complied.182 Further noting that the findings in the underlying WTO proceedings related to the 
payments under the 2002 farm bill and not to the farm bill as such, the Arbitrator concluded that 
the United States had failed to establish that Brazil no longer had a legal basis to seek 
countermeasures for payments under these two programs.183 
The Arbitrator ultimately determined that Brazil could impose countermeasures for the actionable 
subsidies in an amount not to exceed $147.3 million annually.184 The Arbitrator arrived at this 
figure by first determining that the world cotton price would have been 9.38 % higher but for the 
U.S. programs, with adverse effects for the rest of the world of $2.905 billion in marketing year 
(MY) 2005. The Arbitrator further found that this overall amount needed to be apportioned to 
Brazil, basing this apportionment on Brazil’s 5.1% share of worldwide cotton production for the 
same marketing year, or $147.3 million. 
The Arbitrator also found that Brazil may cross-retaliate with regard to the actionable subsidies 
only if the total amount of permissible countermeasures for a given year (i.e., $284.7 million, as 
adjusted) exceeds the monetary import threshold (i.e., $409.7 million, as adjusted).185 Since 
annual countermeasures for the actionable subsidies is fixed at $147.3 million, the use of cross-
retaliation will depend on annual increases in countermeasures due to increased U.S. payments 
under the prohibited subsidy, that is, the GSM-102 export credit guarantee program. 
Brazil’s Preparation of Retaliatory Measure/Bilateral Negotiations to Resolve 
the Dispute 
After the WTO arbitral panel issued its August 2009 reports setting out the permissible scope of 
Brazil’s requested retaliation for both prohibited and actionable U.S. subsidies, Brazil asked the 
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United States to provide it with information on transactions under the GSM-102 export credit 
guarantee program for FY2008 and FY2009 and the most recent data on U.S. export prices of 
products for which the United States had made export subsidy reduction commitments 
(“scheduled” products), namely, pig meat, poultry meat, and rice, for 2008 and 2009.186 Brazil’s 
request was based on language in the Arbitrator’s report on prohibited subsidies directing the 
United States to provide such data to Brazil to enable it to calculate its annual countermeasures 
under the formula set out in the report.187 
In early November 2009, Brazil published a preliminary list of over 200 U.S. products, primarily 
consumer and agricultural goods, that could potentially be subject to increased tariffs.188 On 
November 19, 2009, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body approved Brazil’s request to impose 
countermeasures against the United States consistent with the August 2009 Arbitrator’s 
decisions.189 The United States stated at the DSB meeting that it intended to comply and hoped 
that a resolution of the dispute could be reached, obviating any need for Brazil to impose tariff 
increases and other authorized measures.190 WTO dispute settlement rules do not require that 
Brazil impose countermeasures once it is authorized to do so or that it impose these measures by 
a given date.  
As Brazil prepared for and pursued its retaliation request during the fall of 2009, the USDA 
tightened requirements for the GSM-102 program for FY2010. On September 21, 2009, the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) solicited 
comments from stakeholders on revisions to the GSM-102 fee rate schedule.191 The revisions 
were being proposed to implement requirements in the 2008 farm bill to develop a risk-based fee 
structure for the program. In November 2009, CCC posted higher program fees than those 
proposed earlier.192 In addition, CCC announced that maximum credit terms for FY2010 would be 
based on the risk category of the obligor country associated with the CCC payment guarantees, 
with shorter repayment terms or “tenor” as country risk category increased.193 
On December 21, 2009, Brazil reported to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body that, based on 
U.S.-supplied fiscal and calendar year data for 2008, it was entitled to annual retaliation of $829.3 
million, with $561 million covering trade in goods and $268.3 million covering other sectors and 
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agreements.194 At the same time, Brazil delayed announcing a final list of sanctioned products as 
the two countries engaged in negotiations on at least a temporary resolution of the dispute.195 On 
March 12, 2010, however, Brazil notified the WTO that, beginning on April 7, it intended to 
impose up to $829.3 million in retaliation against the United States, $591 million of which would 
consist of tariff increases on various agricultural products, cosmetics, cotton textiles, appliances, 
motor vehicles, and other items.196 The remainder would involve the suspension of unspecified 
concessions under the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) or the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), or both. 
Recent Developments 
On April 6, 2010, the United States and Brazil announced a preliminary agreement in the cotton 
dispute that temporarily forestalled the imposition of WTO-authorized sanctions by Brazil against 
the United States. The United States agreed (1) to establish a fund with Brazil to provide technical 
assistance and capacity building to Brazilian cotton farmers and to contribute approximately 
$147.3 million to the fund per year on a pro rata basis; (2) to make some “near term” 
modifications of the GSM-102 program and engage in bilateral discussions on the further 
operation of the program; and (3) to address various food safety issues involving Brazilian 
exports to the United States.197 Regarding food safety, the United States agreed that it would 
publish a proposed rule by April 16, 2010, declaring that the Brazilian state of Santa Catarina is 
free of various diseases, complete an ongoing risk analysis for the area, and “identify appropriate 
risk mitigation measures to determine whether fresh beef can be imported from Brazil while 
preventing the introduction of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States.”198 In return, Brazil 
postponed its retaliatory measures until April 22, but also agreed that if sufficient progress were 
made under the preliminary agreement by April 21, it was willing to suspend its measures for an 
additional 60 days.199 
On the same day the agreement was announced, the USDA stated that, effective April 9, it was 
canceling all unused balances of the GSM-102 export credit program announcements issued for 
FY2010 and that, if any unused allocations remained under these announcements, it would issue 
new announcements making the allocations available under new guarantee fee rates.200 On April 
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16, the USDA issued a proposed rule adding Santa Catarina to a list of regions considered free of 
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), rinderpest, swine vesicular disease, classical swine fever, and 
African Swine fever, an action that USDA stated “would relieve certain restrictions on the 
importation into the United States of live swine, swine semen, pork meat, pork products, live 
ruminants, ruminant semen, ruminant meat, and ruminant products” from that region “while 
continuing to protect against the introduction of these diseases into the United States.”201 On April 
20, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding providing for the above-described fund 
for Brazilian cotton farmers.202 According to USTR, the fund “is scheduled to continue until the 
next Farm Bill or a mutually agreed solution to the Cotton dispute is reached” and may be 
terminated by the United States if Brazil imposes retaliatory measures.203 On the same day, USDA 
activated a fee increase for most transaction categories in the GSM-102 program.204 
On June 25, 2010, the United States and Brazil signed a framework agreement aimed at 
permanently settling the cotton dispute, including a pledge by Brazil not to impose authorized 
countermeasures during the life of the agreement and an understanding that the dispute may be 
legislatively resolved in the 2012 farm bill. The agreement provides for (1) bilateral discussions 
on U.S. domestic cotton support; (2) semi-annual reviews of the GSM-102 program to determine 
whether program usage exceeds $1.3 billion for the relevant six-month period and thus whether 
USDA must implement an agreed-upon increase in program fees; (3) bilateral consultations at 
least four times a year on issues relevant to the dispute; (4) Brazil’s agreement not to impose 
countermeasures as long as the agreement is not terminated; and (5) upon the enactment of a 
successor to the 2008 farm bill, consultations to determine whether the statute provides a 
mutually agreed resolution to the dispute.205 The United States and Brazil notified the WTO of 
their agreement on August 27, 2010. 
The United States reportedly began making payments into the cotton fund for Brazilian farmers in 
June 2010.206 Further, the United States and Brazil reportedly determined during the October 
2010 GSM-102 review, the first semi-annual review under the framework agreement, that actual 
usage of the GSM-102 program from April through September 2010 approached, but did not 
exceed, the $1.3 billion threshold and thus an automatic increase in fees for the program was not 
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triggered.207 The USDA issued a final rule regarding the disease-free status of the state of Santa 
Catarina on November 16, 2010.208  
The USDA, which must release $5.5 billion in GSM-102 allocations each year, announced its 
first set of FY2011 allocations at the end of October 2010.209 In addition, USDA has announced 
new GSM-102 guarantee fees, effective February 17, 2011, aimed in part at encouraging the use 
of loans of shorter length (or “tenor”), a less desirable alternative for exporters.210 The next joint 
review of the GSM-102 program, which will examine actual usage of the program from October 
2010 through March 2011, is scheduled to take place in April 2011. 
Measures Affecting Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (DS285) 
Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) requested consultations with the United States in March 2003 
regarding federal, state, and local laws affecting the remote supply of gambling and betting 
services, alleging that the overall effect of these laws was to prevent the supply of gambling and 
betting services from the territory of one WTO Member into the United States in violation of U.S. 
market access commitments in Article XVI of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).211 
As part of their GATS obligations, WTO Members make specific commitments involving 
particular service sectors, subject to any terms, limitations, or conditions Members may add. 
Commitments are made with respect to four means or “modes” by which services may be 
supplied, including supply from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other 
Member, which is the mode of supply at issue in this case. Each Member’s sectoral commitments 
are set out in a Schedule of Specific Commitments, which is attached to the GATS and considered 
an integral part of the agreement. GATS market access and national treatment apply only with 
respect to scheduled commitments. These obligations are set out in GATS Articles XVI and XVII, 
respectively. All GATS obligations are subject to various general exceptions set out in Article 
XIV.  
Among other market access obligations, Article XVI(a) of the GATS prohibits a WTO Member, 
in sectors where it has scheduled a specific commitment, from maintaining or adopting, unless 
specified in its Schedule, “limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of 
numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic 
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needs test.” In addition, Article XVI(c) prohibits a Member, in any such sectors, from maintaining 
or adopting, unless specified in its Schedule, “limitations on the total number of service 
operations or on the total quantity of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical 
units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test.” 
Panel and Appellate Body Reports 
Although the United States did not expressly identify gambling and betting services in its 
Schedule of Specific Commitments to the GATS, the WTO panel, in its November 2004 report, 
interpreted the services sub-sector titled “Other Recreational Services (except sporting)” as 
including gambling and betting services, and concluded that the United States, by not placing any 
limitations on the supply of such services from the territory of one WTO Member into the United 
States, had made market access commitments in the area.212 The panel then found that three 
federal statutes and provisions of four state laws conflicted with these obligations. The federal 
statutes were the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA);213 the 
state laws were those of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Utah. The panel found that 
by preventing one, several, or all means of delivering gambling and betting services, the statutes 
constituted impermissible market access limitations on the number of service suppliers for 
purposes of Article XVI:2(a) of the GATS or, alternatively, on the total number of total number or 
service operations or total quantity of service output for purposes of Article XVI:2(c). 
The panel further found that, with regard to the federal laws, the United States could not 
successfully invoke exceptions in GATS Article XIV for “measures necessary to protect public 
morals or to maintain public order” (Article XIV(a)) or for “measures necessary to secure 
compliance with” GATS-consistent laws and regulations (Article XIV(c)) because the United 
States had not shown that the measures were “necessary” to achieve the stated end or that they 
were consistent with the Article XIV proviso, which requires that measures justified under the 
exception not be applied “in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail.” Under WTO 
jurisprudence, such discrimination may occur not only between the different exporting Members 
but also between an exporting Member and the importing Member and thus in this case between 
foreign and domestic providers of Internet gambling services.214 
In an appeal by both parties to the dispute, the WTO Appellate Body, using a different mode of 
analysis than the panel, nonetheless determined that the United States had made sectoral 
commitments regarding gambling and betting services.215 Though the AB upheld the panel’s 
finding of a violation of GATS market access obligations,216 it reversed the panel on its finding 
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that the United States could not justify the federal measures under GATS exceptions. The AB also 
reversed the panel’s finding that four state laws were inconsistent with the GATS, finding that 
because Antigua had not made a prima facie case that eight state measures violated the 
Agreement, the panel had improperly examined their GATS-consistency. 
With respect to the GATS exceptions, the AB found that the panel had erroneously concluded that 
the three federal statutes could not be considered “necessary” for purposes of Articles XIV(a) and 
XIV(c) because the United States had not entered into consultations with Antigua to find a less 
trade-restrictive alternative. The AB ultimately found that statutes were “necessary to protect 
public morals or to protect public order” for purposes of Article XVI(a) and that they thus fell 
within the scope of this exception.217 At the same time, the AB also found that, in light of a 
provision in the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA) that might facially continue to allow the remote 
supply of wagering on horseracing by domestic firms, the United States had not shown that the 
Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA were being applied consistently with the Article XVI 
proviso, that is, that they may possibly be used to prosecute foreign, but not domestic, providers 
of remote horserace gambling services.218 
Antigua had based its argument that the United States was applying the three statutes 
inconsistently with the Article XIV proviso on two aspects of the IHA, a statute allowing the 
acceptance of interstate off-track wagers provided certain conditions are met, making violators 
civilly liable for damages to named entities, including the state in which the subject horserace 
takes place, and authorizing certain civil suits against violators.219 First, Antigua cited § 5 of the 
act, which it characterized as expressly allowing an interstate off-track wager to be accepted by 
an off-track betting system, where consent is obtained from certain organizations.220 Second, it 
cited the statutory definition of “interstate off-state wager,” which, in pertinent part, includes pari-
mutuel wagers “placed or transmitted by an individual in one State via telephone or other 
electronic media and accepted by an off-track betting system in the same or another State,” 
provided the wagers are lawful in the States involved.221 In the words of the AB, Antigua thus 
argued that: 
the IHA, on its face, authorizes domestic service suppliers, but not foreign service suppliers, 
to offer remote betting services in relation to certain horse races. To this extent, in Antigua’s 
view, the IGHA “exempts” domestic service suppliers from the prohibitions of the Wire Act, 
the Travel Act, and the IGBA.222 
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As further described by the AB, “[t]he Panel found that the evidence provided by the United 
States was not sufficiently persuasive to conclude that, as regards wagering on horseracing, the 
remote supply of such services by domestic firms continues to be prohibited notwithstanding the 
plain language of the IHA.”223 The AB concluded that the panel did not err in making this finding. 
The Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified by the AB, were adopted April 20, 
2005. 
Responses of the United States and Antigua 
The United States reported at the May 19, 2005, meeting of the DSB that it intended to 
implement the rulings and had begun to consider options for doing so, but that it would need a 
reasonable period to comply.224 After the disputing parties had failed to agree on a reasonable 
period of time for compliance, Antigua requested that the compliance period be arbitrated.225 In 
its submission to the Arbitrator, the United States stated that compliance would be achieved “by 
further clarifying the relationship between the IHA and preexisting federal criminal laws” and 
that “U.S. authorities intend to seek further clarification through legislation.”226 
The United States sought a 15-month compliance period, stressing that such legislative action 
would be “technically complex.”227 In an award made public August 19, 2005, the Arbitrator 
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... It requires consideration of the relationship between the IHA and three different federal criminal 
statutes—the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business statute. The Appellate 
Body has made no finding as to whether the activity that is prohibited by these statutes is permitted 
under the IHA. Instead the Appellate Body has emphasized the need to “demonstrate[] that—in the 
light of the existence of the Interstate Horseracing Act—the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the 
Illegal Gambling Business Act are applied consistently with the requirements of the [Article XIV] 
chapeau.” Accordingly a reasonable legislative option would have the effect of clarifying that 
relevant U.S. federal laws entail no discrimination between foreign and domestic service suppliers 
in the application of measures prohibiting remote supply of gambling and betting services. 
... There will be ample room for reasonable and principled disagreements among legislators as to 
precisely how to achieve such a clarification in the context of Internet gambling.... 
... A legislative clarification will be further complicated by the fact that , starting in the 105th 
Congress (1997-98), and continuing in each subsequent Congress through the 108th Congress 
(2003-04), U.S. federal lawmakers have considered a wide range of proposals to address Internet 
gambling. Members of Congress are actively considering introduction of Internet gambling bills in 
the current 109th Congress (2005-2006), and will undoubtedly find it necessary to consider the need 
for compliance with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in the context of this continuing 
debate, and the variety of broader proposals already supported by different groups of legislators. 
The issue of how to achieve compliance with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings is thus 
further complicated by its potential to affect, and be affected by, elements of an already complex 
legislative debate that has gone unresolved over the past four Congresses. 
Id. at 5-7. 
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determined that the compliance period would last 11 months and two weeks from the date of 
adoption of the panel and AB reports, thus expiring April 3, 2006.228 
Legislative action was not taken before the deadline; instead, the United States stated in a status 
report to the DSB that it had complied in the case based on the position of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) regarding remote gambling on horse racing, articulated as follows in April 5 DOJ 
testimony before a House committee: 
The Department of Justice views the existing criminal statutes as prohibiting the interstate 
transmission of bets or wagers, including wagers on horse races. The Department is currently 
undertaking a civil investigation relating to a potential violation of law regarding this 
activity. We have previously stated that we do not believe that the Interstate Horse Racing 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007, amended the existing criminal statutes.229 
Antigua disagreed that the United States was in compliance, and in May 2006, the parties entered 
into a procedural agreement regarding the possible seeking by Antigua of a compliance panel and 
countermeasures in the case.230 
Compliance Proceedings 
Antigua requested a compliance panel in July 2006, claiming that the United States had failed to 
bring the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gaming Business Act into conformity with U.S. 
GATS obligations and that then-pending legislation—H.R. 4777 and H.R. 4411—was “expressly 
contrary “to the WTO ruling in that each bill “would further institutionalise the discriminatory 
effect” of the three cited statutes. It also questioned whether the DOJ statement was a “measure” 
or a “measure taken to comply” for purposes of the DSU, noting that the same position had been 
maintained by the United States during the course of the dispute and was subsequently rejected 
by the panel and Appellate Body. Antigua further argued that regardless of the nature of the DOJ 
statement for purposes of the DSU, the United States remained out of compliance with the GATS 
because of, inter alia, the existence of reasonable technical alternatives to prohibitions on remote 
gambling and betting services and governmental enforcement problems regarding domestic and 
cross-border service providers.231 The compliance panel was established July 19, 2006. 
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 Status Report by the United States, Addendum, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
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the DSU, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/16 (May 26, 2006). Note also Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 21, 2006, at 8-10, 
WT/DSB/M/210 (May 30, 2006). 
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 Request for the Establishment of a Panel, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, United 
States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/18 (July 7, 2006). 
Antigua also made separate arguments regarding the inconsistency of the then-pending bills with U.S. GATS 
obligations, faulting in particular their exclusions for transactions made in accordance with the Interstate Horseracing 
Act (IHA), intrastate transactions, and remote gambling conducted by Native American tribes in accordance with 
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On March 30, 2007, the compliance panel issued a report adverse to the United States, finding 
that the United States had not taken any measures to comply in the case and thus left the statutory 
ambiguity cited by the panel unresolved.232 The panel noted that legislation was not the only 
means of compliance in the proceeding and that “other forms of administrative action, or judicial 
action, [could be used] to bring the measures into conformity.”233 The United States did not 
appeal the report, which was adopted by the DSB on May 22, 2007. 
In early May 2007, the Office of the USTR announced that the United States intended to invoke 
Article XXI of the GATS “in order to clarify its commitment involving ‘recreational services,’” in 
order to bring the United States into compliance in the dispute and to resolve the dispute 
permanently.234 The modification would explicitly exclude gambling and betting services from 
this broader services category. With Antigua’s subsequent pursuit of retaliation in the underlying 
WTO dispute, the United States became engaged in two WTO proceedings, one involving 
negotiations with various WTO Members under Article XXI on compensation for changes in the 
U.S. GATS schedule, and the other involving arbitration of Antigua’s request to impose 
countermeasures against the United States for non-compliance with the WTO decision. 
Negotiations on Compensation under GATS Article XXI  
Article XXI allows a WTO Member to modify or withdraw any commitment in its GATS 
Schedule, but any WTO Member whose GATS benefits may be affected by the proposed change 
has a right to negotiate a compensation agreement with the Member making the change. In 
negotiating an agreement, Members must try to maintain “a general level of mutually 
advantageous commitments” that are as favorable to trade as was the case with the Schedule in its 
original form. In its May 2007 announcement, USTR stated that in negotiating the GATS, the 
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existing federal laws applicable to Native American gaming. 
In October 2006, the President signed into law the SAFE Port Act, which contains an Internet gambling title that 
generally following the House-reported language of H.R. 4411. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 
(UIGEA), P.L. 109-347, Title VIII. The statute prohibits gambling businesses from accepting checks, credit cards, 
electronic transfers and similar forms of payment in connection with illegal Internet gambling, while exempting 
intrastate and intratribal Internet gambling operations that include age and location verification requirements imposed 
as a matter of law. The legislation also leaves unresolved questions as to the extent to which the Interstate Horseracing 
Act restrains the reach of other federal statutes. For further information, see CRS Report RS22749, Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) and Its Implementing Regulations, by Brian T. Yeh and Charles Doyle 
[hereinafter CRS Report RS22749]; CRS Report RS21984, Internet Gambling: An Abridged Overview of Federal 
Criminal Law, by Charles Doyle. 
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 Panel Report, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007)[hereinafter U.S. Gambling 
Article 21.5 Report]. Among other things, the panel concluded that enactment of the UIGEA, see supra note 231, did 
not resolve any of the issues involved in the dispute, citing the statute’s express exclusion of activities allowed under 
the Interstate Horseracing Act and its “sense of Congress” statement that UIGEA “is not intended to resolve any 
existing disagreements over how to interpret the relationship between the IHA and other Federal statutes.” U.S. 
Gambling Article 21.5 Report, supra, paras. 6.130-6.135. 
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 Id. para. 6.90. 
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 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of Deputy United States Trade Representative 
John K. Veroneau Regarding U.S. Actions under GATS Article XXI (May 4, 2007)[hereinafter USTR Press Release, 
May 4, 2007], at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2007/may/statement-deputy-united-
states-trade-represen; Press Release, U.S. Diplomatic Mission to the United Nations in Geneva , Statements by the 
United States at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Meeting, Geneva, May 22, 2007, at http://www.us-mission.ch/
Press2007/0522DSB.html. 
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United States “did not make it clear” that its international commitments to open its market to 
recreational services did not extend to gambling and that since “no WTO Member either 
bargained for or reasonably could have expected the United States to undertake a commitment on 
gambling, there would be very little, if any basis for ... [compensation] claims.”235 
Antigua, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, European Union (EU), India, Japan, and Macao 
requested consultations with the United States by June 22, 2007, the deadline for WTO Members 
to notify the United States that their interests may be affected by the U.S. Schedule 
modification.236 The following month USTR filed a notice in the Federal Register asking for 
public comment on the requested compensation negotiations.237 As provided in GATS procedural 
rules, negotiations were expected to conclude within three months, that is, toward the end of 
September 2007, but the parties agreed on two extensions with a final deadline of January 14, 
2007.238 On December 17, 2007, the United States and the EU announced that they had reached a 
bilateral compensation agreement providing EU service suppliers with improved market access in 
the U.S. postal and courier, research and development, warehouse and storage, and technical 
testing services sectors.239 The United States also announced that it had reached agreement with 
Canada and Japan as well.240 Australia had reportedly settled outstanding issues with the United 
States several months earlier and had withdrawn from the negotiations.241 
Since the United States had not agreed on compensation with Antigua, Costa Rica, India, or 
Macao by the end of the negotiating period, these Members had a right to request that 
compensation be arbitrated, provided that they made their request within 45 days after deadline, 
that is, by January 28, 2008. If none of these Members requested arbitration, the United States 
would then be free to implement its Schedule modification, as originally proposed. Antigua and 
Costa Rica each filed timely arbitration requests.242 India and Macao reportedly did not choose 
this option and thus effectively abandoned their claims.243 In February 2008, Costa Rica reached 
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agreement with the United States on compensation and as a result withdrew its request to 
arbitrate.244 Antigua was thus the only remaining Member pursuing arbitration under Article XXI.  
Under GATS rules, any arbitral panel established under Article XXI would be expected to issue 
its report within three months after the panel is appointed.245 Once a report is issued, the United 
States would not be able to modify its GATS Schedule until it made compensatory adjustments in 
conformity with the arbitration. If the United States modified its Schedule without complying 
with the arbitral decision, Antigua could modify or withdraw substantially equivalent benefits in 
conformity with the arbitral findings. GATS rules would allow the Antigua to apply any such 
change only to the United States, notwithstanding the general most-favored-nation obligation in 
GATS Article II. 
Antigua’s Retaliation Request 
In the WTO dispute itself, Antigua has requested authorization from the DSB to impose $3.4 
billion in countermeasures against the United States for non-compliance, primarily by suspending 
obligations owed the United States under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights.246 The United States objected to the request, challenging both the level of suspension of 
concessions and Antigua’s compliance with DSU principles and procedures governing a WTO 
Member’s consideration of which concessions to suspend.247 Because of the U.S. objection, 
Antigua’s proposal was sent to arbitration. In a ruling issued December 21, 2007, the Arbitrator 
determined that Antigua may request authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions under 
the TRIPS agreement at a level not to exceed $21 million annually.248 The amount was based on 
the Arbitrator’s assumption that the United States would have complied with the ruling by 
opening its market to Antiguan providers of remote gambling on horseracing. 
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Recent Developments 
Although Antigua requested arbitration in January 2008 under GATS Article XXI on 
compensation owed by the United States because of the U.S. withdrawal of gambling 
commitments in its GATS Schedule, there have not been reports that panelists have been 
appointed to hear this claim. Moreover, Antigua has not yet requested the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body to authorize its retaliation request as modified by the December 2007 
Arbitrator’s report in the original WTO dispute settlement proceeding. In a July 2009 government 
press release, the Minister of Finance of Antigua is quoted as stating that “‘[w]hile we may in the 
future consider exercising the right to impose sanctions, as of this moment, I am instead looking 
forward to meeting with the United States government in the near future and focusing on a 
mutually beneficial resolution of the issues raised by the remote gambling case.’”249 The USTR’s 
annual report for 2010 also indicates that the parties have been consulting with a view to 
achieving “a mutually agreeable resolution” to the dispute.250 
A June 10, 2009, European Commission staff report on an investigation under the European 
Union (EU) Trade Barriers Regulation, initiated as a result of a complaint submitted by the 
London-based Remote Gambling Association, indicates persistent EU concerns over U.S. Internet 
gambling regulation and its consistency with U.S. GATS obligations.251 Regarding possible future 
action, a fact sheet accompanying the report states as follows: “The report concludes that WTO 
action would be justified. However, this is not an automatic consequence. The report does not 
include any recommendation for action and also suggests that the issue should be addressed with 
the US Administration, with a view to finding an amicable solution.”252 During their July 2009 
meeting in Washington, USTR Kirk and EU Trade Ambassador Ashton discussed the EU report 
“and its implications for the WTO rights and obligations of the parties concerned.”253 
In November 2008, the Treasury Department and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System issued a final rule implementing the provisions of the 2006 Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act (UIGEA), P.L. 109-347, Title VIII.254 The statute prohibits gambling businesses 
from accepting checks, credit cards, electronic transfers and similar forms of payment in 
connection with illegal Internet gambling, while exempting intrastate and intratribal Internet 
gambling operations that include age and location verification requirements imposed as a matter 
of law. The rule became effective on January 19, 2009, with the original compliance date of 
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December 1, 2009, extended to June 1, 2010. In addition, various bills were introduced in the 
111th Congress to permit Internet gambling under a federal licensing program.255 
Pending Cases Involving Administrative Action 
Five pending WTO disputes in the compliance phase involve administrative action. Each involves 
the practice of “zeroing,” a methodology used by the Department of Commerce (DOC) in 
antidumping proceedings under which DOC, in calculating dumping margins for an imported 
product, disregards non-dumped sales. Two of these cases were brought by the European Union 
(DS294 and DS350), one by Japan (DS322), one by Mexico (DS344), and one by South Korea 
(DS402). The decisions in these cases have resulted in a broad WTO prohibition on the use of 
zeroing in U.S. antidumping proceedings, a multi-phased process consisting of original 
investigations, annual administrative reviews, five-year sunset reviews, and, in some cases, 
changed circumstances and new shipper reviews. 
In response to the first EU challenge (DS294), the Commerce Department in early 2007 
discontinued the use of zeroing in the price comparison employed most frequently in original 
antidumping investigations and recalculated dumping margins in the investigations cited by the 
EU, issuing new determinations under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
(URAA). The United States has yet to fully comply with the WTO decisions in this case, the 
cases initiated by Japan (DS322) and Mexico (DS344), and the second EU challenge (DS350), to 
the extent that the WTO decisions involve the use of zeroing in other phases of U.S. antidumping 
proceedings. In 2010, the EU and Japan agreed not to proceed with sanctions requests in DS294 
and DS322, respectively, on the understanding that the United States would address these 
outstanding issues. In response, the Department of Commerce issued a Federal Register notice in 
December 2010 in which it proposed generally to calculate dumping margins and duty 
assessment rates with an offset for non-dumped sales, that is, without zeroing, in administrative 
and new shipper reviews. 
In September 2010, Mexico requested a compliance panel in DS344, alleging the failure of the 
United States to comply with the WTO decision as it involves antidumping administrative 
reviews in general and reviews of the original antidumping order challenged in the case. On 
February 24, 2011, the WTO adopted the panel report in South Korea’s challenge (DS402), a case 
involving the use of zeroing in original antidumping investigations. This issue was dealt with in 
earlier WTO decisions adverse to the United States and the United States did not contest Korea’s 
claim. 
A sixth case, United States—Antidumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from 
Thailand (WT/DS383), was settled in 2010, with the implementation by the United States of a 
new antidumping determination under Section 129 of the URAA in which the dumping margin on 
the subject Thai merchandise was calculated without the use of zeroing.256 As in the case 
involving Korea, the United States did not offer a defense of its practice.  
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Background: “Zeroing” in Antidumping Proceedings 
U.S. Use of Zeroing 
Under U.S. law, antidumping duties will be applied to an imported product if (1) the Department 
of Commerce (DOC) determines that the product is being, or is likely to be sold, in the United 
States at less than its fair value and (2) the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) 
determines that a U.S. industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or the 
establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of 
the dumped product, or sales or likely sales of the product for importation.257 Antidumping duties 
are imposed in the amount of the dumping margin calculated by DOC.258 The term “dumping 
margin” is defined in § 771(35)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A), as “the 
amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price of the 
subject merchandise.” “Normal value” is generally the sale price of the product in the exporting 
country.259 
Under the practice of zeroing, the department, assigns a zero value to non-dumped sales—that is, 
sales at prices that are equal to or greater than normal value—and disregards these sales in 
calculating a dumping margin for the product under investigation. The practice of zeroing is said 
to inflate or create dumping margins by not allowing dumped sales to be weighed against non-
dumped sales, whereas others argue that the practice combats masked dumping—that is, the 
situation where an exporter masks sales of goods at less than normal value by sales at prices 
above normal value—and that actual dumping may be remedied even though exporters may not 
sell all products at dumped prices in a national market.260  
Stages of U.S. Antidumping Proceedings 
An antidumping proceeding in the United States is a multi-staged process, beginning with an 
original investigation and continuing with annual administrative reviews and five-year sunset 
reviews. In addition, additional reviews are available to determine dumping margins for new 
shippers and to seek revocation of an order in the event of changed circumstances. The United 
States has applied zeroing or relied on zeroing-based dumping margins in all phases of U.S. 
antidumping duty proceedings. 
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Procedures between Thailand and the United States, United States—Antidumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail 
Carrier Bags from Thailand, WT/DS383/4 (Jan. 12, 2010); Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, United 
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Original Investigations 
On the basis of an industry petition and a determination by the Commerce Department of 
sufficient industry support for the petition, the department will initiate an original antidumping 
investigation to determine whether the foreign merchandise identified in the petition is in fact 
being dumped in the United States, that is, sold, or likely to be sold in this country at less than its 
fair value.261 The department investigates merchandise sold for a specified annual period, usually 
the four most recently completed fiscal quarters as of the month preceding the month in which the 
petition was filed262 and ultimately makes a final determination as to whether dumping is 
occurring.263 DOC generally calculates an individual weighted average dumping margin for each 
known exporter or producer of the subject merchandise.264 The term “weighted average dumping 
margin” is defined in § 771(35)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(B), as “the 
percentage determined by dividing the aggregate dumping margins determined for a specific 
exporter or producer by the aggregate export or constructed export prices of such exporter or 
producer.” DOC also calculates an “all others” rate for exporters that are not investigated 
individually.265 In an original investigation, a product will not be considered to be dumped if the 
individual weighted average dumping margin for an exporter or producer is zero or de minimis, 
that is, less than two percent ad valorem.266 
If the ITC makes a final determination that domestic industry is materially injured by reason of 
the dumped imports, DOC will issue an antidumping order, under which estimated duties are 
assessed and importers make cash deposits in the assessed amount on the subject goods. DOC 
also orders the suspension of liquidation, that is, suspension of the final assessment of duties, for 
the imported items. Cash deposits will not be required for goods for which a zero or de minimis 
margin was calculated. 
Annual Administrative Reviews 
The United States uses a “retrospective” system of duty assessment under which the final liability 
for antidumping duties is determined after the goods are imported.267 Thus, the Commerce 
Department, if requested, conducts annual administrative reviews to determine the final 
antidumping duty rate for previously entered merchandise. One year after the antidumping order 
is published, an interested party may petition DOC for an administrative review of the order. In an 
administrative review, DOC examines entries or sales of the subject merchandise during the 12 
months immediately preceding the anniversary month of the order, and calculates dumping 
margins for these goods.268 The department considers this the final antidumping duty and the 
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goods are liquidated in this amount. The rate calculated in the administrative review also serves 
as the cash deposit rate for goods entering the United States under the antidumping order during 
the upcoming year. Commerce Department regulations, at 19 C.F.R. § 351.106(c), provide that 
the de minimis margin in administrative and other reviews is a margin of less than 0.5% ad 
valorem. Entries of goods for which a de minimis margin is calculated will be liquidated without 
regard to antidumping duties. 
If no administrative review is requested for the first anniversary, DOC will apply the cash deposit 
rate applicable at the time the merchandise was originally entered and liquidate the entries at this 
amount.269 If there is an initial administrative review and a review is not requested for the 
following year, duties will be assessed at the rate established in the completed review covering 
the most recent prior period. 
Though infrequently used because of its stringent requirements, the Commerce Department may 
also conduct an expedited administrative review during which the exporter or producer may be 
permitted to post a bond or other security instead of depositing estimated antidumping duties for 
up to 90 days after the relevant antidumping order is published; in such a review, the department 
will render a decision as to the duty assessment rate for the exporter or producer more quickly 
than occurs in an ordinary administrative review.270 
Other Reviews of Antidumping Orders 
Along with administrative reviews, DOC also conducts other types of reviews of antidumping 
duty orders, including (1) “new shipper” reviews, in which exporters who did not export goods 
during the period of investigation or that were not affiliated with an exporter who did export, may 
obtain their own individual dumping margins;271 (2) “changed circumstances” reviews, under 
which interested parties may seek revocation of an AD order on the ground that changed 
circumstances (e.g., the cessation of material injury to the U.S. industry) are sufficient to warrant 
revocation;272 and (3) mandatory five-year “sunset” reviews of existing AD orders.273 In a sunset 
review, DOC and the ITC determine whether revocation of the order would be likely to lead to 
continuation or recurrence of, respectively, dumping and material injury. DOC must revoke the 
order unless each agency makes an affirmative determination.  
Calculating Dumping Margins with Use of Zeroing 
Original Investigations 
As noted above, the term “dumping margin” is defined at § 771(35)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930 
as “the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price of 
the subject merchandise.” In calculating dumping margins in original investigations, the 
Department of Commerce is authorized under U.S. law to make three types of price comparisons, 
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each of which is recognized in Article 2.4.2 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.274 These 
comparisons are (1) weighted average of normal values to weighted average of export prices for 
comparable merchandise (average-to-average); (2) normal values of individual transactions to 
export prices of individual transactions for comparable merchandise (transaction-to-
transaction);275 and (3) if there is a pattern of export prices or constructed export prices that differ 
significantly among purchaser, regions or periods of time that cannot be accounted for through 
using the other two methods (or so-called “targeted dumping”), weighted average of normal 
values to export prices of individual transactions for comparable merchandise (average-to-
transaction).276 
The DOC ordinarily uses average-to-average comparisons in original investigations,277 as was 
the case in the original investigations cited in the EU’s complaint in DS294, discussed below. In 
applying the average-to-average method to a product under investigation, DOC ordinarily divides 
export transactions into sub-groups of the product.278 Considering sales of the products in a sub-
group to be comparable, DOC compares an average of the export prices or constructed export 
prices of the sales in the group to the weighted average of the normal values of such sales and 
determines a dumping margin for the group.279 Once DOC determines the dumping margin for 
each such group, DOC calculates a weighted average dumping margin for each individual 
exporter or producer by aggregating the results of the comparisons.  
Before the department discontinued the use of zeroing (sometimes referred to as “model 
zeroing”) in average-to-average comparisons in original investigations, an action it announced in 
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late 2006 in response to the adverse decision in DS294, it would have assigned a dumping margin 
of zero to any subgroup for which the export price was equal to or exceeded the normal value, 
that is, where there was no dumping. As a result, when the results of the averaging groups were 
aggregated to determine the weighted-average dumping margin for the product as a whole, 
negative dumping margins for particular models could not be used to offset positive margins for 
other models. In other words, in aggregating the model-specific results to determining the 
numerator in the “weighted average dumping margin” calculation, the department used only 
positive dumping margins.280 
Administrative and Other Reviews 
In annual administrative reviews, where DOC assesses the final antidumping duties to be imposed 
on entries of the merchandise entered during the prior year, the department calculates the duty 
owed by an importer by using the average-to-transaction method, that is, by comparing the price 
of each individual export transaction with a monthly weighted-average normal value,281 and 
employing what is sometimes referred to as “simple zeroing.” Thus, where the export price of the 
transaction exceeds the normal value, DOC will consider the dumping margin for the export 
transaction to be zero. The overall weighted average dumping margin for the product is then 
calculated by combining the results of these multiple comparisons and, again, the numerator for 
the overall weighted average margin is determined only on the basis of positive dumping margins. 
DOC ordinarily uses average-to-transaction comparisons with simple zeroing in new shipper 
reviews as well.282 In sunset reviews, the department considers margins established in the original 
investigation and/or the administrative reviews conducted during the sunset review period and, 
thus, to some extent on zeroing-based margins.283 
Domestic Legal Basis for Zeroing 
Although the Tariff Act of 1930, at section 735(A), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35), defines the terms 
“dumping margin” and “weighted average dumping margin,” it does not expressly address the 
practice of zeroing. Using the Chevron standard of judicial review, U.S. courts have held that the 
statute does not unambiguously require zeroing, but that the Commerce Department’s 
interpretation of the statute as allowing the practice is a permissible one.284 Courts have also 
refused to implement adverse WTO decisions on zeroing, leaving determinations as to “whether, 
when, and how” to comply with such rulings to the executive branch.285 
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Further, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled in July 2009 that the Commerce Department’s 
determination under section 123 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act to eliminate the use of 
zeroing in average-to-average comparisons in original antidumping investigations and to offset 
sales made at less than fair value with fair value sales, an action taken in response to the WTO 
decision in DS294, was based on a reasonable interpretation of U.S. antidumping law for 
purposes of Chevron and was thus in accordance with law.286 As discussed earlier, section 123 
sets out statutory requirements for U.S. regulatory modifications taken to implement WTO 
decisions. Thus, in its Chevron analysis, the court also considered that the department was 
undertaking this interpretation in the context of statutory authorities and requirements with an 
international dimension, stating that the “deference accorded to Commerce’s interpretation [under 
Chevron] is at its highest when that agency acts under the authority of a Congressional mandate 
to harmonize U.S. practices with international obligations, particularly when it allows the 
Executive Branch to speak on behalf of the U.S. to the international community on matters of 
trade and commerce.”287 The court further held that, because the section 123 action was in 
accordance with law, the department’s use of this new approach in a Section 129 Determination 
taken to comply with the WTO decision was “not unlawful.”288 In October 2010, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in a decision focused on the section 129 claim, found that the 
department’s Section 129 Determination “reflects Commerce’s reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute” and affirmed the USCIT decision.289  
Courts have given further deference to the Commerce Department on the zeroing issue in refusing 
under step 2 of Chevron to find it unreasonable for the department to construe section 735(A) of 
the Tariff Act as simultaneously permitting abandonment of the practice in average-to-average 
comparisons in original investigations yet permitting the use of zeroing in annual administrative 
reviews.290 
Challenges to the U.S. Use of Zeroing in the WTO 
Nineteen WTO complaints against the United States have challenged the use of zeroing. Along 
with the five pending disputes in the compliance phase, and the recently resolved dispute with 
Thailand, two cases are in the panel phase: Orange Juice from Brazil (DS382) and Shrimp from 
Viet Nam (DS404).291 In Brazil’s challenge, a final panel report adverse to the United States was 
reportedly submitted to the disputing parties on February 21, 2011, and will be publicly circulated 
in March.292 A panel report in Vietnam’s challenge is expected in June 2011.293 In addition, new 
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complaints were filed by Korea and China in February 2011 (DS420 and DS422).294 Finally, nine 
other WTO complaints have cited the U.S. use of zeroing, though not all of these have resulted in 
panels.295 To date, some 26 WTO panel and Appellate Body reports have been rendered on this 
issue. 
The conduct of antidumping investigations and the imposition of antidumping duties are subject 
to obligations in the WTO Agreement on Antidumping and Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. While neither of these agreements expressly address the use of zeroing in 
antidumping investigations or in the various reviews and duty assessments carried out in 
antidumping proceedings, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have found that the use of zeroing 
in original investigations, insofar as average-to-average and transaction to-transaction 
comparisons are used, is inconsistent with obligations in Article 2.4.2 of the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement requiring WTO Members to determine dumping margins by comparing normal and 
export values of “all comparable export transactions.”296 In addition, WTO panels and the 
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Appellate Body have concluded that the use of zeroing in administrative and new shipper reviews 
violates GATT and Antidumping Agreement prohibitions on imposing antidumping duties that 
exceed the dumping margin for the goods under investigation. Further, reliance on zeroing-based 
dumping margins in mandatory five-year sunset reviews of antidumping duty orders has been 
found to violate Article 11.3 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement on the ground that such 
reliance taints the fundamental determination made in sunset reviews, namely, whether revocation 
of the antidumping order is likely to lead to the recurrence or continuation of dumping and injury.  
As a result of these cases, the use of zeroing has been found to be broadly prohibited in the 
calculation of dumping margins in U.S. antidumping proceedings, both as a general practice and 
as applied in particular proceedings. Moreover, findings in related compliance panel proceedings 
that a WTO decision faulting the use of zeroing in an original antidumping investigation 
continues to apply with respect to subsequent annual administrative reviews are particularly 
important for the U.S. “retrospective” antidumping duty system of which administrative reviews 
are a key component. It has also been found in these cases that, where goods have entered the 
United States before the end of the compliance period established in a WTO dispute but final 
duties have not been collected, zeroing-based duties may not be applied to such goods once the 
compliance period has ended. In addition, the Appellate Body has found that an additional claim 
may be made in an initial WTO complaint against zeroing, namely, the “continued use” of the 
practice in subsequent domestic proceedings relating to a particular antidumping duty order.  
To respond to these decisions, the United States, as discussed in greater detail below, has 
prospectively eliminated the use of zeroing in original investigations under a regulatory 
modification issued by the Commerce Department under § 123(g) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act. In December 2010, the department also proposed a regulatory modification on 
the use of zeroing in administrative and new shipper reviews and implied that practice in sunset 
reviews would be affected as well. Where the use of zeroing in an individual original 
antidumping investigation has been challenged, the United States has resolved the case by the 
issuance of a Section 129 Determination in which the dumping margin in question has been 
recalculated without the use of zeroing. As noted above, the United States has not contested 
recent complaints of this type. It appears unlikely, however, that the prospective modification of 
U.S. zeroing practice—that is, its application to new proceedings only—and the issuance of case-
by-case recalculations under Section 129 solely in original investigations will be sufficient to 
satisfy the concerns of all WTO complainants.297  
The United States has been critical of the Appellate Body’s broad prohibition on the use of 
zeroing at meetings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and in related documents circulated to 
Members. In addition, the United States submitted proposals in June 2007 to the WTO 
Negotiating Group of Rules, which has been negotiating revisions to antidumping and subsidy 
rules in the Doha Round, asking that negotiators evaluate the reasoning of the WTO panels that 
have examined the issue of zeroing and stating that “the proper resolution of this issue requires 
clear text providing that margins of dumping may be determined without offsets for non-dumped 
transactions, consistent with the long-held concept of dumping.”298 The United States also 
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proposed revised language for the Antidumping Agreement to this effect.299 While the draft 
negotiating text issued by the Chairman of the Doha Negotiating Group in November 2007 
contained proposed language reflecting U.S. concerns,300 the draft text issued in December 2008 
does not contain such language and instead notes that, with regard to zeroing, “[d]elegations 
remain profoundly divided on this issue,” with positions ranging from “insistence on a total 
prohibition of zeroing irrespective of the comparison methodology used and in respect of all 
proceedings to a demand that zeroing be specifically authorized in all contexts.”301 
Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calculating Dumping 
Margins (“Zeroing”) (DS294) 
In June 2003, the European Union (EU) requested consultations with the United States over the 
use of zeroing by the Commerce Department in determining dumping margins, arguing that the 
practice as it relates to original antidumping investigations and subsequent administrative, new 
shipper, changed circumstances, and sunset reviews was inconsistent “as such” with provisions of 
the WTO Agreement on Antidumping and Article VI of the GATT 1994. That is, complainants 
argued that the existence of the practice violated these agreements regardless of any specific 
application.302 The EU also alleged that the United States had acted inconsistently with its WTO 
obligations in applying zeroing in 31 specific cases, including 15 original investigations and 16 
administrative reviews.303 The EU further claimed that insofar as dumping margins in original 
investigations should be calculated without the use of zeroing and some exporters may thus have 
de miminis dumping margins, these imports should be excluded from the volume of dumped 
imports that the ITC takes into account in determining whether such imports are causing material 
injury to domestic industry. The EU argued that WTO obligations require the United States to 
make this determination based only on the volume of imports remaining after this exclusion. A 
panel was established in March 2004.  
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Panel and Appellate Body Reports 
In a report issued October 31, 2005, the WTO panel found that zeroing, as applied in the 
weighted-average-to-weighted average price comparisons made in the 15 original investigations 
cited in the EU’s complaint, was inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement. 
This article provides, in pertinent part, that “[s]ubject to the provisions governing fair comparison 
in [Article 2] paragraph 4, the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase 
shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of weighted-average normal value of 
prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal value and export prices 
on a transaction-to-transaction basis.”304 The panel based its conclusion on Appellate Body 
rulings in earlier cases that “when a margin of dumping is calculated on the basis of multiple 
averaging by model type, the margin of dumping for the products in question must reflect the 
results of all such comparisons, including weighted average export prices that are above the 
normal value for individual models.”305 The Appellate Body had earlier concluded that the term 
“dumping” in WTO agreements is defined “in relation to a product as a whole” and that, as a 
result, dumping can thus be found to exist “only for the product under investigation as a whole” 
and not solely “for a type, model, or category of that product.”306 Thus, in considering the U.S. 
multiple averaging technique in light of WTO obligations, the Appellate Body concluded that the 
only was that a dumping margin could be properly established for the product as a whole would 
be to aggregate “all of the ‘results’ of the multiple comparisons for all product types.”307  
The panel also found that zeroing, as it relates to original investigations, was a “well established 
and well-defined norm” that could be challenged “as such” in a WTO dispute even though it was 
not in written form, and that, with respect to its use in weighted-average-to-weighted-average 
price comparisons in original investigations, the norm “as such” was inconsistent with Article 
2.4.2.308 
The panel rejected the EU’s claims regarding the application of zeroing in the 16 administrative 
reviews cited by the EU, as well as on the use of zeroing “as such” in administrative reviews, new 
shipper reviews, changed circumstances reviews, and sunset reviews. One dissenting panelist 
would have struck down the use of the practice in proceedings other than original investigations, 
however. The panel did not address EU claims involving the need for a new injury determination 
based on excluded imports, viewing this as a dependent claim and finding that any conclusion 
would not provide the United States with additional guidance as to how to remedy the primary 
violation. 
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The panel report was appealed by the United States and the EU. While the United States appealed 
the panel’s finding that zeroing was a challengeable norm, it did not appeal the panel’s conclusion 
that the use of zeroing in weighted-average-to-weighted-average price comparisons in the cited 
original investigations violated the Antidumping Agreement.309 
On April 18, 2006, the Appellate Body found, although on different grounds from the panel, that 
the zeroing methodology could be challenged “as such” as it relates to original investigations and 
upheld the panel’s finding that the practice is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping 
Agreement.310 
The AB also expanded the range of proceedings in which zeroing was prohibited, finding, 
contrary to the panel, that the United States could not use zeroing in making weighted-average-to-
transaction comparisons to assess duties and set cash deposit rates in the 16 administrative 
reviews challenged by the EU. The AB found that the application of zeroing in these reviews 
violated Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 since the 
practice resulted in the imposition of antidumping duties that exceeded the exporters’ or 
producers’ dumping margins.311 Article 9.3, which sets out obligations regarding the assessment 
of antidumping duties, provides that the “amount of the anti-dumping duty” imposed by a WTO 
Member “shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2” of the 
Agreement. Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 provides that a WTO Member may impose an 
antidumping duty on a dumped product “no greater in amount than the margin of dumping in 
respect of such product.” The Appellate Body did not determine whether the use of zeroing in 
these reviews was “as such” inconsistent with WTO obligations, however, due to insufficient 
facts in the panel record to complete this analysis. 
The AB report, which also addressed other issues, and the modified panel report were adopted on 
May 9, 2006.312 While the United States vigorously disputed the Appellate Body decision,313 it 
stated at a subsequent DSB meeting that it intended to comply.314 The disputing parties later 
agreed on an implementation deadline of April 9, 2007.315 
U.S. Actions in Response  
Shortly before the AB report was issued, the DOC had announced in the Federal Register that, in 
response to the WTO panel report, it would abandon the use of zeroing in weighted-average-to-
weighted-average comparisons in antidumping investigations and was seeking comments on 
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alternative approaches that might be appropriate in future investigations.316 The department noted 
that the United States had not appealed the panel’s finding that the zeroing could not be used in 
making such comparisons in the specific antidumping investigations challenged by the EU. 
On December 26, 2006, the department, following the requirements in section 123 of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), published a Federal Register notice stating that it was 
modifying its antidumping practice as announced earlier, noting that the modification would be 
used in implementing the findings of the WTO panel pursuant to section 129 of the URAA with 
regard to the specific antidumping investigations challenged by the EU in the dispute and, 
moreover, that it would apply the modification in all current and future antidumping investigation 
as of the effective date, which at the time was planned for January 16, 2007.317 The department 
later extended the date to January 23, 2007, and then to February 22, 2007, noting each time that 
it was acting “[a]fter further consultations with Congress and in order to afford adequate time for 
review.”318 
The department also announced on February 22, 2007, that it was initiating section 129 
proceedings in which it would implement the WTO ruling with respect to 12 of the 15 original 
antidumping investigations cited by the EU, three of the cited AD orders having been revoked.319 
On April 9, 2007, the Department of Commerce issued new Section 129 Determinations in 11 of 
the proceedings using average-to-average comparisons in which offsets were provided, two of 
which resulted in findings of no dumping.320 The DOC also postponed its determination in the 
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12th investigation, a proceeding involving stainless steel products from Italy, as it was 
investigating a possible clerical error in the original investigation alleged by the respondent. 
Recalculations were done without the use of zeroing as provided in the modification originally 
announced in December 2006.321 Regarding the administrative reviews at issue in the dispute, the 
United States stated that since they had been superseded by new administrative reviews, it did not 
need to take any further action to bring these reviews into compliance with the WTO decision.322 
The USTR instructed DOC to implement the new determinations on April 23, 2007.323 
While the United States considered itself in compliance,324 the EU questioned the prospective 
nature of the new determinations, that is, that they did not cover duties on goods entered before 
the date the Section 129 Determinations were implemented; claimed that DOC had “massively 
increased the ‘all others’ rate (applicable to exporters who do not have an individual duty rate, 
notably new exporters)”; and stated that the United States was obligated to review the dumping 
margins in the 16 challenged administrative reviews, claiming that to its knowledge the United 
States had not taken any action to bring these reviews into compliance with the WTO decision.325 
On May 4, 2007, the United States and the EU entered into a procedural agreement regarding 
possible Article 21.5 compliance panel proceedings and the sequencing of a possible retaliation 
request in the event the United States was found not to have complied in the case.326 The EU 
requested consultations with the United States under Article 21.5 in July 2007.327  
In September 2007, DOC issued a new determination in the outstanding antidumping case 
involving steel products from Italy, finding that the alleged clerical errors were not raised in the 
WTO dispute and thus were outside the scope of the Section 129 proceeding.328 
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Compliance Proceedings 
The EU requested a compliance panel in September 2007, claiming that the United States had 
failed to take compliance actions in some cases and that measures that it had taken in others were 
inconsistent with WTO obligations.329 In its panel request, the EU cited specific administrative 
reviews and sunset reviews undertaken by the United States in the 15 original investigations and 
16 administrative reviews that were successfully challenged in the original proceeding. The EU 
also claimed that United States violated its WTO obligations in those cases where it had 
recalculated dumping margins in original investigations without the use of zeroing, found that 
some exporters were not dumping or had de miminis margins, and maintained the antidumping 
order without determining whether the remaining amount of dumped were causing material injury 
to domestic industry.  
The compliance proceeding was complex not only because of the number of U.S. antidumping 
determinations that the EU claimed were WTO-inconsistent, but also because of the interaction of 
the retrospective U.S. duty system with what has generally been considered to be the prospective 
nature of remedies in a WTO dispute. As described by the WTO Appellate Body, the WTO 
dispute settlement system is one under which “compliance has to be accomplished at the latest 
from the end of the reasonable period of time [i.e. the compliance period] with prospective 
effect.”330 At the same time, due to the U.S. retrospective system, there were goods that had 
entered the United States before the date on which the compliance period ended but for which 
final duty assessments would not be made until after this date, or for which final assessments 
were made before this date, but the duties were not collected until after the period expired. While 
the United States and the EU agreed that the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding provides 
only for prospective remedies, the parties disagreed on what this entailed for the United States 
with regard to these earlier-entered goods.331 
Questions also arose as to whether dumping determinations made in a phase of the proceeding 
that occurred after the one at issue in the original WTO dispute were considered measures taken 
to comply or whether they were properly before the panel for other reasons. Some of the 
challenged determinations, which had been rendered in original investigations, were the subject 
of later administrative or sunset reviews. In addition, the challenged administrative reviews had 
been superseded by determinations made in subsequent administrative reviews. Further, the 
United States had taken new action in some of the challenged proceedings before the panel and 
Appellate Body reports were issued. 
The United States argued that administrative reviews of challenged dumping determinations made 
in original investigations were not measures taken to comply with the WTO decision and thus 
outside the panel’s terms of reference.332 In its view, the compliance panel could only review 
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whether the original determination now complied with the WTO decision and could not examine 
whether the United State had employed zeroing in the subsequent review. The United States made 
the same argument with regard to administrative reviews that occurred after those that were 
challenged in the dispute and protested the inclusion of sunset reviews of challenged 
determinations as well.333 As noted above, the United States maintained that since the challenged 
administrative reviews had been superseded by later reviews, the United States was not required 
to take any action to ensure that the challenged determinations were in compliance. The EU 
argued that under this approach, the EU would need to initiate a new dispute settlement 
proceeding for each subsequent administrative review with which it disagreed, thus allowing the 
United States to avoid permanent compliance with a WTO decision as it related to a specific 
investigation or review that was successfully challenged.334 In addition, the United States had 
undertaken sunset reviews of some of the challenged original determinations and administrative 
reviews prior to the adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports by the Dispute Settlement 
Body, actions that the EU claimed could not be considered measures taken to comply with the 
WTO rulings and recommendations in these reports. 
Compliance Proceedings: Panel and Appellate Body Reports 
In December 2008, the panel issued a mixed report regarding U.S. compliance,335 which the EU 
appealed. In a report issued May 20, 2009, the Appellate Body found that the United States 
remained out of compliance with its WTO obligations in a variety of respects.336 
Regarding whether actions taken by the United States before the panel and Appellate Body 
reports were adopted were within the panel’s terms of reference, the Appellate Body, reversing 
the panel, found that measures taken before this date were potentially reviewable as compliance 
measures. The Appellate Body found that the relevant inquiry was not whether the measures were 
intentionally taken to comply, but instead whether they each had a “sufficiently close nexus, in 
terms of nature, effects, and timing,” with the WTO decision and with the declared measures that 
were in fact taken to comply.337 The AB found that of the five sunset reviews that met this test 
determinations in four of these, having relied on dumping margins calculated with the use of 
zeroing, were inconsistent with WTO obligations; no findings were made on the fifth.338 
Regarding whether subsequent administrative and sunset reviews of challenged measures were 
amenable to review, it was determined in the compliance proceeding that administrative reviews 
involving the calculation of a dumping margin based on zeroing and subsequent sunset reviews in 
which DOC relies on dumping margins calculated with the use of zeroing, could potentially fall 
within the scope of the compliance proceeding, This conclusion was based on two grounds: (1) 
the “close nexus that exists in terms of their nature” between the subsequent reviews and 
measures at issue in the original dispute and (2) the fact that “the subsequent reviews potentially 
affect or undermine the steps otherwise taken—or the steps that should have been taken—by the 
United States to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, notably in the form of 
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Section 129 determinations.”339 The panel had noted that the use of zeroing in an administrative 
review of an original determination could potentially negate the results of a Section 129 
determination in which the dumping margin was calculated without its use, thus undoing an 
action taken to comply with the WTO decision.340 
Further, regarding the scope of U.S. obligations involving imports entering the United States 
before the end of the compliance period, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the 
calculation of dumping margins in administrative reviews, or “definitive duty determinations,” 
that occurred after the end of the compliance period, but that involved imports entered before this 
date, could not be made with the use of zeroing.341 Contrary to the panel, however, the Appellate 
Body determined that duties could not be collected after the end of compliance period 
consistently with WTO obligations if they are based on dumping margins calculated with the use 
of zeroing during administrative reviews that occur before the end of the compliance period. The 
panel had found entries could be liquidated on the basis of a zeroing-based dumping 
determination without violating WTO obligations even though actions taken by the United States 
after the compliance deadline would ordinarily be expected to comply with the WTO decision. 
The Appellate Body found that any measures that “derives mechanically” from the assessment of 
duties, as is the case with the collection (or liquidation) of antidumping duties, would not be 
WTO-compliant to the extent they are based on zeroing and are applied after the compliance 
deadline expires.342  
Before drawing these conclusions, the AB had generally noted that, with respect to the original 
determinations and administrative reviews in which the use of zeroing was challenged “as 
applied,” the assessment of a final duty for previously imported goods in an administrative review 
also affects the cash deposit rate for certain future imports, a situation that has implications for 
the administrative reviews not directly at issue in the case. Thus, in light of the prospective nature 
of WTO remedies, “compliance is not confined by the limited duration of the original measures at 
issue, especially when a subsequent measure replaces or supersedes the measure at issue in the 
original proceeding.”343 
The panel and AB made various findings regarding the inconsistency of particular determinations 
challenged by the EU with the obligation to eliminate zeroing. Further, the panel, in an issue not 
reviewed by the AB, determined that, with regard to four original determinations for which 
Section 129 determinations were issued, the United States violated the Antidumping Agreement 
by not revisiting its ITC material injury determinations due to revised import volumes. In some 
cases, the recalculated dumping margins had led to findings of no dumping or de minimis margins 
for particular exporters and thus the panel found that, in these four cases, the United States was 
obligated to reconsider whether dumped imports were causing material injury to domestic 
industry using import volumes that excluded these non-dumped and de minimis imports.344 
The adverse Appellate Body report and the modified compliance panel report were adopted on 
June 11, 2009. With the compliance panel proceeding completed, the EU has stated that the 
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United States is required to comply “without delay” by recalculating dumping margins without 
the use of zeroing in the numerous dumping determinations faulted in the case and then collecting 
duties at the recalculated rates.345 At the same time, the United States has raised concerns about 
what it views as the expanded scope of U.S. obligations in the case.346 
Recent Developments 
On February 2, 2010, the EU requested authorization from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to 
suspend WTO tariff concessions owed the United States for non-compliance in the case.347 The 
EU proposed either a “a prohibitive tariff (such as, for example, 100%) on a specified annual 
value of trade from the United States to the European Union; or of an equivalent ad valorem tariff 
on an equivalent annual value of trade.”348 In the first scenario, the prohibitive tariff would be 
applied to an annual value of trade from the United States to the EU of $311 million; in the 
second scenario, an ad valorem tariff of 13.18% would be applied to an annual value of trade of 
$477 million.349 The United States objected to the EU’s request, automatically sending it to 
arbitration.350 At the request of the parties, however, the arbitration was suspended as of 
September 8, 2010, upon the understanding that the United States would take action “in the 
foreseeable future” to comply fully with its obligations in the case.351 The suspension may last up 
to one year, but may also be terminated by either party before then. The Arbitrator has stated that 
if it has not had a request for resumption by September 7, 2011, it will circulate its report on 
September 15, 2011. 
To respond to outstanding WTO dispute settlement issues, the Commerce Department issued a 
proposed rule on December 28, 2010, to eliminate the use of zeroing in administrative reviews, 
new shipper reviews, and expedited administrative reviews.352 The department has proposed, in 
general, to calculate weighted average margins of dumping and duty assessment rates to provide 
offsets for non-dumped sales using monthly average-to average comparisons in reviews “in a 
manner that parallels the WTO-consistent methodology” that the DOC has been using since 2007 
in original antidumping investigations.353 Unless the department determines that a different price 
comparison is “more appropriate,” the department proposes “to compare weighted average export 
prices with monthly weighted average normal values and to grant an offset for such comparisons 
that show export price exceeds normal value in the calculation of the weighted average margin of 
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dumping and assessment rate.”354 Antidumping duties will not be assessed if the weighted 
average margin is zero or de minimis.355 Further, if the use of transaction-to-transaction price 
comparisons in any prior original investigations “could be considered as establishing a practice of 
the Department” with respect to use of zeroing when calculating the weighted average margin of 
dumping, an issue arising in Japan’s challenge in DS322 (see discussion later in this report), the 
department proposes “to withdraw any such practice.”356 
Regarding the WTO-inconsistency of U.S. practice in five-year sunset reviews, the department 
has stated the following: 
the Department notes that the underlying issue is the methodology for calculating weighted 
average dumping margins in investigations and reviews, which is addressed by the 
modifications the Department has made with respect to investigations and is proposing 
herein to make with respect to reviews. Moreover, the Department recognizes that while 
section 752(c) of the [Tariff] Act [of 1930] provides that the Department shall consider the 
weighted average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews, 
among other factors, the Act does not require that Department to rely on the weighted 
average dumping margins, or any particular weighted average dumping margin, as the basis 
for its determinations in five-year (sunset) reviews where such reliance would render the 
determination inconsistent with the United States international obligations.357 
The comment period on the proposal closed on February 18, 2011. At 2011 meetings of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body, the EU and Japan responded positively to the U.S. proposal to 
eliminate the use of zeroing as a general practice in reviews, but indicated that they will not 
consider the United States to be in full compliance with its WTO obligations unless the United 
States ceases the collection of zeroing-based duties under existing antidumping orders and, as 
argued by the EU, refunds zeroing-based duties collected after the termination of the compliance 
period in the cases brought by the EU.358 
Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (DS322) 
In November 2004, Japan instituted a broad challenge of the use of zeroing by the United States, 
claiming in its subsequent panel request that the use of this practice in original antidumping 
investigations, administrative reviews (referred to in the case as “periodic reviews”), new shipper 
reviews, sunset reviews, and changed circumstances reviews was in violation of obligations in the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement. Japan also challenged zeroing as applied in 15 specific 
antidumping proceedings, including one original investigation, 12 administrative reviews, and 
two sunset reviews. The cited cases involved imports of steel plate and steel flat products, as well 
as roller, ball, spherical plain, and antifriction bearings. In addition, Japan challenged subsequent 
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material injury determinations made by the U.S. International Trade Commission based on 
dumping margins determined through zeroing and made further claims regarding sunset reviews 
and changed circumstances reviews in which determinations were based on dumping margins 
obtained in this way. 
Panel and Appellate Body Reports 
In a report circulated September 20, 2006, the WTO panel concluded that zeroing, when used by 
DOC in weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparisons in original antidumping 
investigations and consequently, the use of zeroing in the one original investigation cited by 
Japan, were inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement.359 As in DS294, 
discussed above, zeroing was found to be a norm that could be challenged “as such” in a WTO 
dispute settlement proceeding. 
At the same time, the panel rejected Japan’s claims that the use of zeroing in transaction-to-
transaction comparisons and weighted-average-to-transaction comparisons in original 
investigations, its use administrative reviews and new shipper reviews, its application in the 11 
cited administrative reviews was violative of the Antidumping Agreement. The panel also found 
that Japan had failed to make a prima facie case that the use of zeroing in changed circumstances 
reviews and sunset reviews violated WTO obligations. The panel also rejected Japan’s claims that 
the ITC had improperly relied on dumping margins calculated in previous proceedings in the two 
sunset reviews cited by Japan. Both Japan and the United States appealed the decision. 
In a ruling issued January 9, 2007, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s findings that zeroing 
could be challenged “as such,” but went further in finding that U.S. measures did in fact 
constitute “as such” violations of the WTO antidumping obligations.360 The Appellate Body found 
that, in maintaining zeroing procedures in transaction-to-transaction comparisons in original 
investigations, the United States was in violation of Articles 2.4 of the Antidumping Agreement, 
which requires that a “fair comparison ... be made between the export price and the normal 
value,” and Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement, which as noted earlier, provides that “[s]ubject to the 
provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of margins of dumping during 
the investigation phase shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of weighted-
average normal value of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of 
normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis.” 
The Appellate Body further found that by maintaining zeroing procedures in administrative 
reviews, the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the Antidumping Agreement, 
Article 9.3 of the Agreement, which provides that amount of the antidumping duty actually 
assessed “shall not exceed the margin of dumping” as determined under Article 2 of the 
Agreement, and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, which provides that a WTO Member may 
impose an antidumping duty on a dumped product “no greater in amount than the margin of 
dumping in respect of such product.” 
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The Appellate Body also found that, by using zeroing in new shipper reviews, the United States 
was out of compliance with Articles 2.4 and 9.5 of the Antidumping Agreement, the latter setting 
out requirements for such reviews. 
In addition, the Appellate Body upheld Japan’s “as applied” claims, finding that the United States 
had acted inconsistently with Articles 2.4 and 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article VI:2 
of the GATT 1994 by applying zeroing in the 11 administrative reviews cited by Japan. 
The Appellate Body also determined that, in relying on zeroing-based dumping margins in two 
cited sunset reviews, the United States had acted inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the 
Antidumping Agreement. Article 11.3 requires that duties be terminated after five years unless 
authorities determine in a review “that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.” The Appellate Body had found in an earlier 
dispute that WTO Members are not required to rely on dumping margins in making this 
determination, but that, if Members choose to do so, they must calculate the margin in conformity 
with the requirements of Article 2.4 of the Agreement.361 If not, the “likelihood” determination 
would not serve as a proper foundation for maintaining the duty under Article 11.3 The Appellate 
Body found in the instant case that the United States, in making its sunset determinations, had 
relied on zeroing-based margins calculated in earlier administrative reviews. Since the Appellate 
Body had also found that the use of zeroing in such reviews is inconsistent “as such” with 
Articles 2.4 and 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, it concluded that reliance on these margins in 
the sunset reviews thus violated Article 11.3.362 
The Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified, were adopted by the DSB at its 
January 23, 2007, meeting.363 The United States, while once again disputing the Appellate Body’s 
reasoning, told the DSB on February 20, 2007, that it intended to comply with its WTO 
obligations in the case and that it needed a reasonable period of time to do so.364 It later circulated 
a critical analysis of the Appellate Body decision to WTO Members.365 While Japan had 
originally requested the compliance period be arbitrated,366 the parties later agreed on a 
compliance period ending December 24, 2007.367 
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Actions by the United States and Japan in Response  
In its December 7, 2007, WTO status report on the case, the United States made reference to the 
modification adopted by the Commerce Department in February 2007 under which zeroing would 
no longer be used in weighted average-to-weighted average comparisons in original 
investigations and stated only that is was “continually to consult internally on steps to be taken 
with respect to the other DSB recommendations and rulings.”368 While the Department of 
Commerce had initiated a proceeding under section 129 of Uruguay Round Agreements in 
November 2007 regarding the challenged original investigation, a proceeding involving certain 
steel plate products, and publicly released final results on December 27, 2007,369 it took no final 
action to comply by the December 24 deadline.370 
In January 2008, Japan requested authorization to retaliate by imposing additional import duties 
on selected products in an initial annual amount of $181.2 million.371 While the subsequent U.S. 
objection sent Japan’s request to arbitration,372 the disputing parties entered into a procedural 
agreement in March 2008 under which Japan was permitted to request a compliance panel 
without first seeking consultations and, if it made such a request, its retaliation request would be 
suspended.373 Under the procedural agreement, either party may request that the arbitration 
resume in the event that the compliance proceeding results in a finding that U.S. compliance 
measures are inadequate or non-existent or “there is no disagreement” between Japan and the 
United States that “a measure taken to comply does not exist” with respect to certain U.S. actions 
that were successfully challenged in the original dispute. 
The United States maintained in a status report to the Dispute Settlement Body and in a DSB 
meeting held on January 21, 2008, that it was in compliance in the case because it was no longer 
making average-to-average price comparisons in original investigations without offsets, it had 
issued a revised dumping determination using this methodology in the one challenged original 
investigation, and it did not need to take action with respect to the challenged administrative 
reviews because they had been superseded by subsequent reviews.374 
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Compliance Panel Proceedings  
As provided for in the U.S.-Japan procedural agreement, Japan requested a compliance panel on 
April 7, 2008, stating that the United States was in violation of its WTO obligations by not having 
fully complied with respect to the one original investigation at issue; by continuing to use zeroing 
in transaction-to-transaction comparisons in original investigations, administrative reviews, and 
new shipper reviews; by applying zeroing in five of the administrative reviews originally 
challenged by Japan and as well as in three “closely connected” administrative reviews that the 
United States argued had superseded earlier reviews; and by relying on zeroing in one of the 
originally challenged sunset reviews and a subsequent sunset review of the same antidumping 
duty order.375 The compliance panel was established on April 18, 2008. On June 6, 2008, the 
United States and Japan asked the arbitration panel that was reviewing Japan’s January 2008 
retaliation request to suspend its work.376  
In the interim, DOC, on May 20, 2008, announced the results of the section 129 proceeding 
involving the challenged original investigation, stating in the Federal Register that it had 
recalculated the affected dumping margins, arriving at slightly reduced rates, which, at the 
direction of the U.S. Trade Representative, went into effect on April 8, 2008.377 
The compliance panel issued its report on April 20, 2009, finding that the United States had not 
complied with its WTO antidumping obligations in the administrative reviews cited by Japan and 
in maintaining zeroing in transaction-to-transaction comparisons in original investigations and in 
any price comparison used in administrative and new shipper reviews.378 While the United States 
had argued that it did not have compliance obligations with respect to five of the reviews because 
the covered goods had entered the United States before the end of the compliance period, the 
panel found that the United States was required to bring the importer-specific assessment rates 
determined in these reviews into compliance with its WTO obligations by the end of the 
compliance period.379 The panel also addressed a situation that had not been ruled upon in 
DS294—that is, one in which duties are assessed before the end of the compliance period, but 
liquidation instructions are delayed because of injunctions issued under domestic judicial 
proceedings challenging the assessment—and found that the fact that the delay was due to 
litigation was of no consequence to compliance with the WTO obligations in the case.380 
The panel further determined that the United States had violated GATT Article II prohibitions on 
imposing tariff surcharges on goods subject to negotiated tariff rates (so-called “bound items”) by 
issuing WTO-inconsistent liquidation instructions in four challenged administrative reviews 
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involving ball bearing products after the compliance period expired.381 These reviews were 
among the five with delayed liquidations because of pending litigation. While the panel had 
agreed with the United States that the Article II claims were derivative of Japan’s claims under 
the Antidumping Agreement, it nonetheless found it appropriate to rule on them because “they 
raise an important point of contention between the parties regarding the right of the United States 
to continue liquidating entries after the expiry of the RPT [reasonable period of time] on the basis 
of liquidation measures issued pursuant to administrative reviews that have already been found to 
be WTO-inconsistent.”382 
The panel additionally concluded that the United States was out of compliance with its WTO 
obligations by not withdrawing or modifying the likelihood of dumping determination in the 
challenged 1999 sunset review in which the United States had relied on zeroing-based dumping 
margins.383  
The United States appealed the adverse compliance panel report in May 2009. In a report issued 
August 18, 2009, the Appellate Body upheld the compliance panel on all issues appealed, 
including against U.S. claims regarding the judicial delay of liquidation and violations of GATT 
Article II.384 The Appellate Body emphasized that all antidumping duties collected after the end 
of the compliance period needed to be calculated without the use of zeroing. Among other things, 
it upheld the panel’s dismissal of the U.S. argument that judicial delay of liquidation permits the 
collection of zeroing-based antidumping duties after the compliance period expires, stating, inter 
alia, that it was “not persuaded that the initiation by private parties of domestic judicial 
proceedings is relevant for determining the scope of the United States compliance obligations in 
this case.”385 
The Appellate Body and compliance panel reports issued in the Article 21.5 proceeding were 
adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on August 31, 2009. At the meeting, the United 
States referred Members to its earlier public statements regarding its intent to comply in all the 
WTO zeroing disputes and stated that it was “working actively to implement these 
recommendations and rulings, including those made in other disputes for which the reasonable 
period of time … is still ongoing.”386 The United States added, however, that in its view the 
appeal of the compliance panel report in this case “was not about zeroing but rather concerns 
what a Member with a retrospective antidumping system must do to come into compliance with 
the DSB’s recommendations and rulings with respect to individual administrative reviews” and 
that the dispute in addition “raised important procedural issues as to the scope of dispute 
settlement proceedings.” Noting the prospective nature of WTO remedies, the United States cited 
the systemic implications of applying obligations under a WTO decision to governmental actions 
involving goods that enter the defending Member’s customs territory before the end of the 
compliance period, an approach that, in its view, could be taken toward all border measures 
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imposed on imports, including ordinary tariffs. It also took issue with Appellate Body’s finding 
that the obligation not to use zeroing applied to duty liquidations that take place after the 
expiration of the compliance period where the liquidation is delayed due to litigation, as well as 
the Appellate Body’s affirmance that a particular administrative review could be reviewed by a 
compliance panel even though the proceeding was not in existence at the time that Japan made its 
panel request. 
Recent Developments 
In April 2010, Japan requested that arbitration of the sanctions proposal it had made in January 
2008 be resumed.387 The arbitration, which was requested by the United States, had been 
suspended since June 2008 following Japan’s request for a compliance panel. Under the U.S.-
Japan procedural agreement in the case, Japan had reserved the option to resume the arbitration 
once the compliance panel process was completed, assuming, as here, that Japan prevailed before 
the panel and Appellate Body. On December 10, 2010, the United States and Japan asked the 
arbitrator to suspend its work once again on the ground that the parties were entering into 
informal discussions on the implementation of the WTO decisions in the case.388 The suspension 
may be terminated at any time at the request of either party; further, the arbitrator will 
automatically resume its work on September 8, 2011, unless Japan submits a written 
communication to the contrary by September 7. To address outstanding issues in the case, the 
Commerce Department, on December 28, 2010, issued a proposed rule to eliminate the use of 
zeroing in administrative reviews, new shipper reviews, and expedited administrative reviews and 
to withdraw the use of zeroing in transaction-to-transaction price comparisons in original 
investigations to the extent that this activity may be considered a WTO-inconsistent “practice.” 
For further discussion, see the entry for “Recent Developments” under DS294. 
Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico 
(DS344) 
Mexico challenged (1) the use of model zeroing by the United States in original antidumping 
investigations, both as such and as applied in an original investigation of Mexican stainless steel 
sheet and strips in coils and (2) the use of simple zeroing in annual administrative reviews, both 
as such and as applied in five administrative reviews in the antidumping proceeding involved.389 
A panel report issued December 20, 2007, concluded that model zeroing, as used in original 
investigations, was inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement, both as such 
and as applied in the cited antidumping investigation.390 The panel ruled in favor of the United 
States, however, in finding that the use of simple zeroing, either as such or as applied in the cited 
administrative reviews, was not inconsistent with the GATT Article VI or the Antidumping 
Agreement. 
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In an appeal by Mexico, the Appellate Body issued a report on April 30, 2008, in which it 
reversed the panel’s findings on the use of simple zeroing, finding, as it had in earlier disputes, 
that the use of this practice in administrative reviews, both as such and as applied in cited 
antidumping cases, was inconsistent with Article VI:2 of the GATT and Article 9.3 of the 
Antidumping Agreement.391 The Appellate Body also criticized the panel for not adhering to 
earlier Appellate Body rulings on this issue, stating that, although it was “well settled that 
Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute 
between the parties,” this principle “does not mean that subsequent panels are free to disregard 
the legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports that 
have been adopted by the DSB.”392 Examining the use made of panel and Appellate Body reports 
in subsequent disputes and by WTO Members in enacting laws and issuing regulations, and the 
role played by the Appellate Body in the WTO dispute settlement system vis à vis panels, the 
Appellate Body concluded that the “Panel’s failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body 
reports addressing the same issues undermines the development of a coherent and predictable 
body of jurisprudence clarifying Members’ rights and obligations under the covered agreements 
as contemplated under the DSU.”393 
The Appellate Body report and modified panel report were adopted at the May 20, 2008, meeting 
of the Dispute Settlement Body. During the meeting, the United States stated its support for the 
panel’s conclusions regarding simple zeroing and questioned the approach taken by the Appellate 
Body in reversing the panel.394 It did not, however, discuss compliance in the case. The United 
States later circulated a document in which it questioned in a more detailed fashion the reasoning 
and approach of the Appellate Body regarding the use of zeroing in the transaction-specific 
calculations employed in administrative reviews.395 
Because the parties could not agree on the length of the compliance period, the issue was 
arbitrated at Mexico’s request. In an October 31, 2008, decision, the Arbitrator set a deadline of 
April 30, 2009.396 
The Commerce Department issued a determination under section 129 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act on March 31, 2009, in which it recalculated the dumping margin in the original 
investigation without the use of zeroing, and later published a notice in the Federal Register that 
the USTR had instructed the department to implement this determination effective April 23, 
2009.397 The recalculation resulted in a reduction of the dumping margin from 30.85% to 30.69% 
for one individually investigated exporter and the same reduction in the “all others” rate. 
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With respect to the administrative reviews that were challenged “as applied,” the United States 
has reportedly informed the WTO Dispute Settlement Body at its May 20, 2009, meeting “that 
‘any prospective effect of those reviews has been eliminated and all entries of merchandise under 
the five reviews have been liquidated for customs purposes.’”398 With regard to other rulings and 
recommendations in the dispute, however, the United States “informed the DSB that it ‘has also 
been conferring with Mexico about the steps that the United States has taken to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.’”399 On May 19, 2009, the United States and Mexico 
entered into a sequencing agreement involving the possible request by Mexico of a compliance 
panel and, if it is later determined that the United States has not taken a measure to comply or its 
compliance measures are inconsistent with WTO obligations, a request for authorization to 
suspend concessions owed the United States.400 
Recent Developments 
On August 19, 2009, Mexico requested consultations with the United States under Article 21.5 of 
the DSU regarding U.S. compliance in the case.401 Mexico maintains that the United States has 
not complied with the WTO decision because it (1) “has not taken any steps” to eliminate the use 
of simple zeroing in periodic, that is, administrative, reviews; (2) continues to maintain and use 
simple zeroing in the five administrative reviews originally challenged in the case; and (3) 
continues to “impose, assess and/or collect anti-dumping duties in excess of the proper margin of 
dumping, and evidences its intention to continue to do so, through … five subsequent periodic 
reviews [of the original antidumping duty order on stainless steel and sheet in coils from Mexico] 
... , any amendments thereto, any measures closely related thereto, any future subsequent periodic 
reviews, and the United States Government instructions and notices.” 
The U.S.-Mexico procedural agreement gave the parties 15 days to consult on Mexico’s request, 
after which Mexico could request a compliance panel. Mexico requested a compliance panel on 
September 7, 2010,402 and DSB referred the matter to the original panel later that month.403 The 
panel has not yet issued its report.  
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Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology 
(DS350) 
Although the European Union (EU) had successfully challenged the U.S. use of zeroing in 
DS294, it was concerned that the United States had not yet broadly discontinued use of the 
practice. In October 2006, the EU challenged the continued use and application of zeroing in 18 
specific antidumping cases, citing the continued application of antidumping duties at a level in 
excess of the margins that would result from correct application of the Antidumping 
Agreement.404 Ten of the 18 cases had been at issue in the EU’s earlier challenge, DS294. The EU 
also challenged the use of zeroing in administrative and sunset reviews in 13 cases, a sunset 
review in one case, and original investigations in four others, a total of 52 agency determinations. 
Along with challenging the use of zeroing both “as such” and “as applied” in the cited 
antidumping determinations, the EU also claimed that a duty based on zeroing, while not falling 
within either of these two categories, was a “measure” subject to WTO dispute settlement.405 The 
EU considered this new argument to be “key” to the proceeding since, in its view, its effect 
“would be that of bringing the future use of United States zeroing in each case within the scope of 
the panel findings.”406 The EU later abandoned its “as such” claim after Japan successfully 
obtained a ruling on this point in DS322.407  
In its October 1, 2008, report, the WTO panel found that the United States acted inconsistently 
with its obligations in the Antidumping Agreement by (1) using model zeroing in the four cited 
original investigations; (2) applying simple zeroing in 29 of the cited administrative reviews 
cited; and (3) relying on dumping margins obtained through model zeroing in the eight sunset 
reviews at issue.408 The panel found, however, that claims involving the continued application of 
antidumping duties in the18 antidumping cases were not within the panel’s terms of reference. 
One panelist, while agreeing with these conclusions, disagreed with the legal reasoning used by 
the panel in considering the EU’s claims on simple zeroing in periodic reviews and, in part, on 
model zeroing in original investigations. The report was appealed by both the EU and the United 
States. 
In a report issued on February 4, 2009, the Appellate Body ruled that “the continued use of 
zeroing in successive proceedings in which duties resulting from the 18 anti-dumping duty orders 
are maintained, constitute ‘measures’ that can be challenged in WTO dispute settlement.”409 The 
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Appellate Body determined that it had a sufficient factual record to make findings on this basis in 
four of the 18 cases cited by the EU and found that, with respect to these four cases, the 
application and continued application of antidumping duties was (1) inconsistent with Article 9.3 
of the Antidumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 to the extent that the duties 
were calculated with zeroing in administrative reviews, and (2) inconsistent with Article 11.3, to 
the extent that reliance was placed on a zeroing-based margin in sunset reviews.410 
The Appellate Body also upheld the panel’s findings that zeroing was improperly applied in 29 of 
the challenged administrative reviews and, contrary to the panel, was able to find that the United 
States had acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations in five additional administrative reviews 
originally cited by the EU.411 In addition, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that the 
United States had acted inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement in eight 
sunset reviews.412 
The Appellate Body Report and the modified panel report were adopted at the February 19, 2009, 
meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body. As it had with respect to past appellate reports on 
zeroing, the United States expressed concerns with the Appellate Body’s approach to a variety of 
issues in the case.413 At the March 20, 2009, meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, the United 
States stated that it intended to comply in the dispute, “would be considering carefully how to do 
so,” and would need a reasonable period of time for this undertaking.414 In June, the United States 
and the EU agreed on a compliance period ending December 19, 2009.415 
Recent Developments 
With the compliance deadline of December 19, 2009, before it, the United States stated in its 
December 10, 2009, WTO status report that the USTR had sent a written request to the Secretary 
of Commerce to issue a Section 129 determination that would render four final antidumping 
determinations at issue in the case not inconsistent with the recommendations and rulings of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.416 The United States also stated that it would “continue to consult 
with interested parties in order to address the other findings” contained in the adopted panel and 
Appellate Body reports.417 At the December 21, 2009, meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body, the United States added that it was “sure that Members appreciate the difficulties that are 
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raised for the United States by the Appellate Body findings on zeroing in this disputes and 
others,” reiterating the action that it had taken and the ongoing discussions on unresolved 
issues.418 At the same meeting, the EU reportedly “expressed its disappointment that the 
reasonable period of time for implementation had expired and the US had yet to bring itself into 
compliance.”419 With other issues in the case remaining unaddressed, the United States and the 
EU entered into a procedural agreement in the case in January 2010 providing for a possible 
compliance panel request by the EU.420  
To address outstanding issues in this and other related cases, the Commerce Department, on 
December 28, 2010, issued a proposed rule to eliminate the use of zeroing in administrative 
reviews, new shipper reviews, and expedited administrative reviews. For further discussion, see 
the entry for “Recent Developments” under DS294. 
Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products 
from Korea (DS402) 
In November 2009, Korea requested consultations with the United States over the use of zeroing 
in calculating overall weighted margins of dumping in final Department of Commerce 
determinations in three antidumping investigations involving Korean products. At Korea’s 
request,421 a panel was established in April 2010. A panel report adverse to the United States was 
publicly circulated on January 11, 2011,422 and adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on 
February 24, 2011.423 The United States did not offer a defense in the panel proceeding and, as 
has occurred in similar cases in the past, will likely seek to resolve the case by issuing, within a 
mutually agreed-upon period, new final determinations under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act in which the dumping margin in each investigation is calculated without the use 
of zeroing.  
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